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The conventional wisdom that the computer industry thrives in the
absence of government regulation is wrong. Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") rules touch every personal
computer ever made. Over the last quarter-century, the FCC has
steadily increased its influence over personal computing devices and
applications. Perhaps surprisingly, though, the "Federal Computer
Commission" has largely been a positive force in the technology
sector. Regulators are now poised to take several actions that could
shape the future of the Internet and the computer industry. In this
environment, exposing the Federal Computer Commission provides
a foundation for reasoned policy approaches. The fate of a
dynamic and important set of industries should not be decided
under the influence of a myth.
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INTRODUCTION
If there is one thing Internet and communications policy
advocates of all stripes can agree on, it is the folly of creating a
Federal Computer Commission. There is no agency with that name,
and everyone seems happy to keep things that way. Members of
Congress,' policy advocates,2 legal scholars,3 and even the Chairman
of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "the
1. See Gary H. Anthes, Telecom Overhaul Hits Roadblock in Congress,
COMPUTERWORLD, June 5, 1995, at 8 (" 'We already have too many federal bureaucracies
and do not need to add a "Federal Computer Commission" to the list,' [Representative
Rick White] said in a statement."); Congressmen Decry the "Federal Computer
Commission," TECH L.J., Mar. 31, 1998, http://www.techlawjournal.com/
telecom/80331fcc.htm; Elizabeth Wasserman, A New Year Brings Talk of New Net Rules
(Jan. 6, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9901/06/newrules.idg/ (" 'We want to
make sure the FCC doesn't become the Federal Computer Commission,' says Ken
Johnson, press secretary to Representative W.J. 'Billy' Tauzin.").
2. See, e.g., George Gilder, Telecosm: From Wires to Waves, FORBES ASAP, June 5,
1995, at 124, 141 (urging communications regulators to look to the computer industry in
dealing with telecommunications deregulation); Stephen Labaton, Antipiracy Rule for
Broadcasts is Struck Down, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2005, at Al ("Critics had also maintained
that the [C]ommission had overreached and had moved to regulate the Internet more
tightly, ridiculing the agency in the aftermath of the [broadcast flag] rulemaking as the
'federal computer commission.' ").
3. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE
FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM passim (1997) (comparing the
unregulated computer industry with the regulated communications industry and arguing
for abolition of the FCC); Tom Zeller, Jr., Federal Effort to Head Off TV Piracy Is
Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at Cl (" 'This is about whether the F.C.C. is going
to become the Federal Computer Commission and the Federal Copyright Commission,'
said Gigi B. Sohn, the co-founder and president of Public Knowledge.").
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Commission")4 have favorably compared the unregulated, highly
competitive, innovation-rich computer industry with the Byzantine
intrigues of the regulated communications industry. Even defenders
of the FCC laud it for not extending its regulatory reach into the
computer world. There is an apparent consensus that, whether the
FCC is the problem or the solution for the communications world, it
must not be allowed to influence other industries.
The FCC is an independent federal administrative agency that
oversees all forms of interstate and international communications.
Established by the Communications Act of 1934,6 it regulates major
industries such as broadcast television, radio, cable television, wired
telephone service, mobile phones, and satellite communications. For
most of the FCC's history, the primary companies it regulated-
broadcasters and telephone companies-operated as either
government-sanctioned monopolies or licensees of scarce
government-controlled assets.7 The FCC subjected these companies
to pervasive "public interest" regulation, far beyond what most U.S.
companies experience.8 FCC involvement in an industry thus became
an object of fear.9 And nothing could be scarier than the prospect of
the FCC muscling in on the unregulated high-tech paradise of the
computer industry.
Any view so widely shared, yet seldom examined, ought to be
suspect. The trouble with the conventional wisdom is that there
already is, in effect, a Federal Computer Commission. There has
been for some time. The FCC was regulating end-user computing
devices plugged into the phone network for nearly a decade before
4. See Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Speech to the Center for
National Policy: The Progressive Way (May 6, 1996), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/
spreh624.txt.
5. See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 205 (2003) (concluding that the FCC's
market-based policies allowed new technologies to flourish); Jason Oxman, The FCC and
the Unregulation of the Internet (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Office of Plans and Policy,
Working Paper No. 31, 1999), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp3l
.pdf; Hundt, supra note 4.
6. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
615b (2000)).
7. See HUBER, supra note 3, at 4.
8. See id. at 24-34.
9. See id. at 5 (describing centralized regulation of communications as a shadow that
descended upon the nation in the late 1920s and early 1930s). This perception of the FCC
is eminently contestable. FCC regulation has historically served many public interest
goals. However, the salient point for present purposes is how the FCC is perceived, even
if unfairly.
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the personal computer ("PC") was introduced. 1° The FCC began
regulating wireless equipment forty years before that," and it did not
stop regulating end-user hardware when the PC came along. Quite
the contrary. Over the last quarter-century, the FCC has reaffirmed
and gradually increased its influence over personal computing
devices.'" More surprisingly, the Internet's arrival only accelerated
this trend. Perhaps most surprising, the Federal Computer
Commission has been, in most cases, a positive force in the
technology sector.
Computers13 are everywhere in the modern world. There are
now over 600 million PCs in use worldwide, a number "expected to
hit or exceed one billion by 2010." 14 More than half a billion mobile
phones are sold every year, 5 with increasingly sophisticated "smart
phone" computing capabilities becoming standard. 6 Sony, Microsoft,
and Nintendo have sold a combined 100 million current-generation
video game consoles, each of which has the processing power of a
high-end PC. 7 FCC regulations touch a significant percentage of
these computing devices. 8 As higher percentages of computers
incorporate data networking, voice, and video capabilities, they will
move even more squarely within the FCC's regulatory ambit.19
10. See infra Part II.A.1.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part III.
13. A "computer" for purposes of this Article is a device incorporating a digital
microprocessor and a direct end-user interface. Personal computers are thus only one
type of computer.
14. Michael Kanellos, A Billion PC Users on the Way, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 2,
2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1003_3-5290988.html. Global PC shipments totaled
nearly 200 million units in 2005. Jay Wrolstad, Global PC Sales Leveling Off,
NEWSFACTOR TECH. NEWS, Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.newsfactor.com/hardware/story
.xhtml?story-title=Global -PC-Sales-Leveling-Off&story-id=30526.
15. John Walko, Handset Sales Reach New High in 2004, EE TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 27,
2005, http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml;?articlelD=59100009.
16. Keith Reed, How Smart Is Your Cellphone?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2005, at
D1.
17. Nick Wingfield & Robert A. Guth, Console Makers Woo Creators of Videogames,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2005, at B1 ("Sony has sold more than 74 million PlayStation 2
machines compared to 20 million for Microsoft's Xbox and more than 10 million of
Nintendo's GameCube.").
18. See infra Part II. This paper focuses both on equipment marketed as "computers"
(such as laptops) and end-user computing devices designated as something else (such as
mobile phones).
19. The FCC's jurisdiction is limited to the United States. However, because the
United States is such a significant market, as well as a model for regulators elsewhere, the
FCC's influence is global.
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The FCC followed four independent paths toward computer
regulation. First, beginning with the Carterfone2° decision in 1968, it
created rules to police the interface between the telephone network
and end-user communications devices. 21  In regulating how the
network talked to end-user hardware, the Commission also regulated
how that hardware talked to the network.22 In the subsequent
Computer Inquiries, the Commission gradually expanded its efforts to
nurture what became the computer industry through interface
regulation.23 Second, the FCC used its authority over radio frequency
emissions to define technical standards for "unintentional radiators,"
including personal computers. 24 Again, this technical beginning laid
the foundation for policy-based regulation of devices, such as the
mandate that television sets include a "V-Chip" to allow blocking of
violent and sexual programming.25 Third, the Commission has sought
to achieve social policy mandates in ways that involve further
regulation of computer hardware.2 6 And finally, in recent years, the
Commission has directly addressed computer-based applications such
as instant messaging ("IM") and Voice over Internet Protocol("VoIP"). 27
Many of these rules were already in place when Steve Jobs and
Steve Wozniak hacked together their first Apple computer in the
1970s.2 8  As the personal computer industry grew, however,
regulatory involvement in that industry grew apace. And the first
years of the twenty-first century have witnessed an unprecedented
expansion of the FCC's involvement in the computer business.2 9 If
current proposals are adopted, every significant participant in the
computer industry will, as a matter of course, need to consider the
implications of FCC actions for its products. Some of those products
will require explicit FCC pre-approval to enter the marketplace. It is
not a stretch to say that companies such as Sony and TiVo,
participants in the "unregulated" computer and consumer electronics
industries, will soon face more significant FCC regulation than pure
20. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Servs. (Carterfone), 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
21. Id. at 423,426-27.
22. See infra Part II.A.1.
23. See infra Part II.A.2.
24. See infra Part I1.B.
25. See infra Part II.C.2.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See infra Part II.D.
28. See STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION 249-50
(1984).
29. See infra Part III.
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communications companies like Vonage and Level 3, or even today's
AT&T.
30
The growing scope of the Federal Computer Commission is not
necessarily a negative development. The FCC and other government
agencies regulate not with the intent of destroying markets, but to
nurture and protect them. As discussed below, most of the FCC rules
affecting the computer industry have actually had a salutary effect.
Moreover, there is something like a law of conservation of regulation
in network industries. Increased FCC oversight of end-user hardware
often goes hand-in-hand with decreased regulation of communications
networks. The drift of communications regulation, at least since the
1980s, has been to move away from regulated monopolies and toward
competitive markets for telecommunications services." However,
scaling back the FCC's traditional activities may mean increased
involvement in areas where the Commission was previously absent.
The action has shifted from the infrastructure to the applications and
data on top. The recent emphasis on deregulation of service
providers may be masking a shift from one type of regulation to
another.
The driving force behind the FCC's growing involvement in the
computer industry is the technological trend known as convergence.32
Convergence means that communications and computing are
becoming one field. Simply by doing what it has always been legally
obligated to do with regard to the communications industry, the FCC
finds itself deeply entangled in the computer industry. In other
words, the FCC's growing influence over computers does not reflect a
conscious expansion of the agency's role. The computer industry
moved toward the FCC much faster than the agency itself has moved.
Unfortunately, technology policy discourse has not yet adverted
to this reality. It is still trapped in a Manichaean narrative of
diabolical regulation, in which every issue comes down to more
30. On October 31, 2005, the FCC approved the takeover of AT&T by SBC
Communications in a transaction valued at $16 billion. Regulators Approve Phone
Company Mergers, with Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at C8.
31. See Dean Burch, Common Carrier Communications by Wire and Radio: A
Retrospective, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 85 (1985) ("On this the fiftieth anniversary of its
charter, the Federal Communications Commission is firmly on the road to deregulation of
the telephone industry.").
32. See Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications




government or less, with less being the right answer. 3  This storyline
is becoming increasingly untenable. The FCC is the Federal
Computer Commission, like it or not. The question is what sort of
Federal Computer Commission we will have.
Because both FCC proponents and detractors ignored FCC
regulation of computer hardware and software, that regulation
developed in an ad hoc fashion. The Federal Computer Commission
grew up in the shadows of information and communications policy. It
is rarely spoken about, let alone defended. This is a mistake. If there
is to be a Federal Computer Commission, there should be a sense of
how, what, and why that Federal Computer Commission regulates
computer devices and applications. Rather than pretend the FCC has
no business meddling in the computer industry, we should examine
situations where the FCC has done so in the past and is proposing to
do so in the future.
The dangers of an inchoate Federal Computer Commission can
be seen in the recent FCC broadcast flag proceeding.3 There, the
agency directly mandated the design of digital hardware without any
express statutory authorization. Under the FCC's proposal, all
devices capable of receiving digital television signals, including
computers, would have had to incorporate technology intended to
prevent unauthorized copying of digital programming. In defending
these actions in court, the Commission and the Department of Justice
adopted an expansive reading of the Communications Act, one which
put few limits on the government's ability to oversee the computer
industry.36 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit overturned the broadcast flag rules, finding that
they exceeded the FCC's statutory authority.37  Although the
outcome placed some constraints on the agency's actions,38 the court's
33. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85-86,
231-34 (chiding those who blindly advocate keeping cyberspace "unregulated"); Declan
McCullagh, Taxes on Tap for Internet Chat?, CNET NEWS.COM, July 26, 2004,
http://news.com.com/Taxes+on+tap+for+Internet+chat/2010-1028_3-5281883.html
(criticizing prospective FCC rules governing VoIP).
34. See infra Part III.D.2.
35. Digital Broadcast Content Protection: Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,552 (2003) [hereinafter Broadcast Flag
Order].
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. Am. Library Ass'n. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
38. See id. ("[T]he FCC has no authority to regulate consumer electronic devices that
can be used for receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices are not
engaged in the process of radio or wire transmission.").
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decision was based on narrow statutory and technical grounds.39 The
lack of a real policy framework opens the door to the kind of
unconstrained regulatory interference the computer industry has long
feared.
This Article seeks to bring the Federal Computer Commission
out of the shadows. Part I sets the stage by describing the
conventional wisdom about the FCC's regulation of computers. Part
II catalogs the many ways the FCC actually does regulate computers
and related end-user hardware or software. Part III examines how
advancing technologies and other changes in the communications and
computing industries are increasing the FCC's involvement in the
computer industry. Part IV criticizes the lack of a clear intellectual
framework for FCC computer regulation and outlines how such a
framework could be developed.
Clearing out the underbrush in this way produces some
important conclusions. First, more often than not, FCC regulation
has advanced the development of the computer industry and its
illustrious stepchild, the Internet. Second, a more clear-eyed
assessment of when and how the FCC affects the computer world
provides a starting point for future decisionmaking. Applying current
thinking about communications regulation to the FCC's actions in the
computer realm offers productive guidance for regulators.
I. FEAR AND LOATHING
In March 1998, the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection held a hearing
to question the FCC's implementation of the so-called "E-Rate"
Program, a congressionally-mandated fund to subsidize Internet
access for schools and libraries.4' Representative Christopher Cox of
California opened his remarks with a withering attack,4" arguing the
Commission had created "essentially a two and one half billion dollar
tax that is going to be used ... for sucking the Internet into the vast
web of the Federal Computer Commission. '4 2
39. See infra Part III.D.2.
40. See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000) (establishing "E-Rate" discounts for schools and
libraries); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service: Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
8776, 9002-92 (1997) (implementing the program).
41. Congressman Cox subsequently became Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, another agency grappling with a volatile industry that occupies a large share
of the U.S. economy. See Cox Receives Senate's OK to Head SEC, L.A. TIMES, July 30,
2005, at C3.
42. Congressmen Decry the "Federal Computer Commission," supra note 1.
[Vol. 84
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As Cox's tone suggests, the term "Federal Computer
Commission" produces an almost visceral recoil in policy
discussions.43 The computer industry' and its defenders celebrate the
sector's high rate of growth, innovation, and competition, which they
attribute to the operation of unfettered market forces. 5  If the
computer industry is so successful without regulatory involvement,
they ask, why is there still a need to regulate the similarly technology-
driven communications sector?46  Throughout the mid-1990s,
conservatives and libertarians used this argument as the basis of a
sustained campaign to abolish the FCC.47
Then-FCC Chairman Reed Hundt rose to the defense of his
agency, stating in a 1996 speech:
Those who wish to eliminate the Federal Communications
Commission explain their conclusion by simply observing, well,
we don't have a Federal Computer Commission, do we? And
that industry is thriving, isn't it?
43. See, e.g., Labaton, supra note 2 (noting criticism of the FCC's broadcast flag
decision for potentially regulating the Internet). The FCC shares this instinctive response
to the "Federal Computer Commission" phrase. When the author revealed the title of this
Article to a senior official at the Commission, his immediate response was, "Oh no."
44. This Article uses the phrase "computer industry" broadly to refer to
manufacturers of personal computer hardware and software, data networking equipment,
and Internet-based applications or content.
45. Well-known communications lawyer Peter Huber epitomized these arguments in
an influential 1997 book. See HUBER, supra note 3, at 22-23.
46. The communications companies the FCC explicitly regulates ask the same
question. See Neil Hickey, Revolution in Cyberia, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug.
1995, at 40, 42 (quoting former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich as saying, "I was at a
dinner one night and I asked fifteen c.e.o.s [sic] of telecommunications companies if we
would be better off if [the FCC] were abolished, and all fifteen raised their hands.").
47. See Declan McCullagh, Why the FCC Should Die, CNET NEWS.COM, June 7, 2004,
http://news.com.com/Why%2Bthe%2Bthe%2BFCC%2Bshould%2die/20101028_3522697
9.html; see also HERITAGE FOUND., ROLLING BACK GOVERNMENT 40, 150-53, 156
(Scott A. Hodge ed., 1995) (recommending the establishment of private property rights in
the spectrum and an end to federal management of spectrum property); GEORGE A.
KEYWORTH ET AL., THE TELECOM REVOLUTION: AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY passim
(1995) (describing a "Replacement Model" calling for abolition of the FCC and
establishment of an "Office of Communications"); Lawrence Gasman, Telecompetition
Revisited: An Agenda, REGULATION, Spring 1995, at 22-24, 30-31 (setting forth a plan
calling for the abolition of the FCC and reliance on market-based enforcement); Peter
Huber, Abolish the FCC, FORBEs, Feb. 13, 1995, at 184 (arguing that existing government
agencies and private enforcement could replace the FCC); Alan Pearce, Telecom Reform
on the Money for GOP Backers, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 20, 1995, at 1, 56 (quoting
House Speaker Newt Gingrich's support for a student advocating abolition of the FCC).
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The analogy is wrong. We don't need a Federal Computer
Commission because in fact the computer industry was never a
state-authorized monopoly ....
But communications markets are intensely concentrated, as
a result of five decades of pro-monopoly laws, and the scale of
investment for competition in these markets is in the hundreds
of billions.48
Hundt's defense of the FCC conceded a central point of its
antagonists: government involvement would be inimical to the health
of the computer industry. His point was that the communications
industry was a wholly distinct world. The fact that those industries
are hurtling towards one another did not enter into the equation.
Even parties who disagree about most communications policy
issues thus agree that a Federal Computer Commission would be a
very bad idea. According to this conventional wisdom, the computer
industry thrives because government stays away.
The FCC itself has reinforced this notion. It claimed some credit
for facilitating the Internet's rise, precisely because it had not
regulated it.49 In other words, the FCC looked itself in the mirror and
did not like what it saw. It heeded the arguments of economists and
others who criticized the Commission for hindering innovation in the
communications sector.5 0 When the Internet came along, the FCC
was careful to steer clear lest it corrupt the brilliant new technology.
The fear and loathing of the Federal Computer Commission
boogeyman jives with a reassuring bedtime story that technologists
like to tell themselves. In this narrative, the computer industry and
the new Internet arena are the domain of bold, self-made
48. Hundt, supra note 4. Ironically, Hundt and Cox were once law partners at the
firm of Latham & Watkins. See Carrie Johnson, A Step Toward a Shift at SEC, WASH.
POST, July 26, 2005, at D1 (highlighting Cox's experience at Latham & Watkins); Michael
Kilian, FCC Chiefs Signals Strong on Changes in Communications, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7,
1994, at C1 (describing Hundt's time at Latham & Watkins).
49. See Oxman, supra note 5, at 24 (proclaiming the virtues of a heretofore
unannounced policy of "unregulation" of the Internet). Oxman's focus was on the
Internet, but his argument applied to the FCC's relationship with the computer industry as
well. Other commentators have pointed out the hollowness of the FCC's claimed
adherence to unregulation as a reason for the Internet's success. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser,
Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822, 823
(2001) (attacking the "unregulation" concept).
50. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition and Regulatory
Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1216 (1995) ("In the
United States, the particular policies that have had the effect of suppressing competitive
entry or substitution in communications are almost too numerous to list.").
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entrepreneurs, while the communications world is filled with coddled,
risk-averse bean counters who live to exploit labyrinthine
bureaucracies and artificial regulatory arbitrage."' Unconsciously
echoing nineteenth-century social Darwinists, the computer industry
pats itself on the back for its demonstrated success. 2 It looks at the
communications industry as proof of the corrupting effects of public
assistance. Good markets, to this way of thinking, are defined not by
effective regulation, but by the absence of regulation. Nothing scares
a technologist more than hearing, "I'm from the government; I'm
here to help."
The symbols of Silicon Valley are lonely entrepreneurs, like the
founders of HP, eBay, and Apple Computer hard at work in their
garages. Those innovators did not seek prior approval from anyone.
In fact, rejection by the powers-that-be was an initial motivator. 3
They followed their dreams, insights, technical brilliance, and
business savvy, and wound up changing the world. Any regime that
forces such innovators to seek authorization from a regulator before
introducing new products is, needless to say, anathema to this
worldview.
In today's world, however, this story of freedom from regulation
falls apart. Developers can pursue their dreams in splendid isolation
only if the products they develop are self-contained. Yet today, every
personal computer shipped includes hardware and software for
connecting to the Internet and an increasing share of computer usage
depends on those Internet connections. When devices start linking
up with networks, the barrier between unregulated computers and
regulated communications diminishes. The computers themselves
may not be subject to FCC jurisdiction, but the companies producing
them must take the FCC into account.
Those who introduce devices dependent on connections to
communications networks must always receive permission ahead of
time, or at a minimum, tacit approval. That permission comes either
from the network owner or a government agency. The producer of a
stand-alone device, which the PC was for most of its existence, is the
master of its own destiny.54 The producer of network-connected
51. See CHARLES H, FERGUSON, THE BROADBAND PROBLEM 35,57 (2004); Steve V.
Steinberg, Netheads vs Bellheads, WIRED, Oct. 1996, at 145.
52. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT (1992) (describing social Darwinism).
53. See LEVY, supra note 28, passim.
54. Other participants in the computer market itself, such as operating system vendors
and distributors, may threaten the computer manufacturer. However, none of these are
regulated businesses.
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equipment, on the other hand, has nothing without the network. It
can only innovate if the network permits.
Companies seeking to deploy broadband applications such as
online gaming, VoIP, or streaming video now face exactly this
dilemma. They are experiencing opposition or potential speed bumps
from the phone and cable companies that dominate the last-mile
broadband "pipes" into the home." For most of the Internet's
history, a set of design rules, shared practices, and technical standards
collectively described as the "end-to-end" principle, prevented
network infrastructure owners from limiting innovation on top of the
network. 6 No more. End-to-end survived in the commercial Internet
world because the underlying physical networks were regulated by
the FCC.57 Under current FCC policies, broadband access providers
are not obligated to follow the end-to-end principle and, as a result,
they may choose not to.
There is a lively debate today about whether the government
should mandate "network neutrality" to prevent such anticompetitive
moves." The basic idea is that the FCC could require broadband
access providers to guarantee that their users can access any resource
on the Internet in a nondiscriminatory way. Thus, for example, a
telephone company would be prohibited from blocking customers of
its broadband Internet service from using a competing VoIP service.59
Both sides of the network neutrality debate acknowledge that
network operators are likely to serve as gatekeepers for broadband
applications and content. Those opposed to mandatory network
neutrality believe that such restrictions will be economically efficient
and will not prevent application and content providers from
55. For example, the FCC recently fined a telephone company for blocking the
software ports VoIP provider Vonage uses to provide its service. See News Release, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell Commends Swift Action to
Protect Internet Voice Services (Mar. 3, 2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/
attachmatch/DOC-257175Al.pdf.
56. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930-31 (2001).
57. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS
IN A CONNECTED WORLD 41-46 (2001); Oxman, supra note 5, at 15-16 (discussing FCC
regulation of telephony versus internet service providers).
58. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 141, 141-44 (2003); Declan McCullagh, Tech Companies Ask for
Unfiltered Net, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 18, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
966307.html.
59. See Declan McCullagh, Telco Agrees to Stop Blocking VoIP Calls. CNET
NEWS.COM, Mar. 3, 2005, http://news.com.com/2100-7352_3-5598633.html.
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voluntarily negotiating for the access they require.6 ° Even under that
viewpoint, the hardware, software, and content providers seeking to
innovate in a broadband world are no longer masters of their own
destiny. They must ask for, and receive through negotiation, the
ability to reach their customers in the way they desire. Whether the
FCC will address this issue remains uncertain, although in a 2004
speech then-Chairman Michael Powell pledged his support in
principle for network neutrality.61 The Commission also adopted a
nonbinding policy statement in August 2005 favoring neutrality in
principle.62
Communications is not a technology, a type of product, or a
particular mass medium. It is a set of network industries that
necessarily involves economic tensions that have historically led to
regulation.63 Network industries include electricity, the postal service,
railroads, and the Internet.' Each of them, with one exception, was
subjected either to federal administrative regulation or court-
mandated common carriage obligations.65 The exception, of course, is
60. See David P. McClure, Feasibility Issues Inherent in the "Layers" Model for
Internet Public Policy, in NEW MILLENNIUM RESEARCH COUNCIL, FREE RIDE:
DEFICIENCIES OF THE MCI 'LAYERS' POLICY MODEL AND THE NEED FOR PRINCIPLES
THAT ENCOURAGE COMPETITION IN THE NEW IP WORLD 11, 14 (2004),
http://www.newmillenniumresearch.org/news/071304_report.pdf; Christopher S. Yoo,
Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment
on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 65 (2004).
61. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Fall 2004
Voice on the Net Conference (Oct. 19, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/
attachmatch/DOC-253325A1.pdf; Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium: Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding
Principles for the Industry (Feb. 8, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf.
62. See infra note 331 and accompanying text.
63. Although network industries have traditionally been considered "natural
monopolies" which must be regulated, there are also incentives for a platform owner to
facilitate innovation and competition on top of its platform. Joseph Farrell and Phil
Weiser describe these dynamics as the "internalization of complementary externalities."
Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 101 (2003); see also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 434-36 (1985)
(describing the economic benefits of product compatibility); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 549
(1998).
64. Other examples of network industries are canals, stagecoaches, the telegraph, and
airlines.
65. Common carriage, a concept developed for railroads in the nineteenth century,
means that the provider must serve all prospective customers indiscriminately. See Adam
Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 369, 381-82
(2004).
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the Internet. It is an exception that proves the rule. The Internet
developed out of a government program, the ARPANET, which
included neutral interconnection as one of its elements.66 And once
the Internet was privatized, there was no need for direct government
regulation because the underlying network pipes were already
regulated by the FCC.67
The celebrated success story of Internet "unregulation" is
therefore really about effective regulation. The FCC boogeyman has
never been far from the garages of the entrepreneurial supermen.
And as the Internet has matured, it has begun to raise similar
regulatory issues that historically emerged from the regulated
communications industries. The "vast web of the Federal Computer
Commission," about which Representative Cox warned, is hiding in
plain sight.68
II. FCC COMPUTER REGULATION: PAST AND PRESENT
The Federal Communications Commission came to regulate
computers not through some bold initiative but as a by-product of its
ongoing activities. Thus, understanding the scope and future
prospects for the Federal Computer Commission requires a trip
through history. This Part describes the four lines of regulatory
activity that form the basis for the FCC's involvement in the
computer industry: the Part 68 and Computer Inquiry rules for
wireline telephone networks, decisions governing the use of the radio
spectrum for wireless communication, social policy initiatives such as
the Schools and Libraries Fund and the V-Chip, and rules covering
particular Internet-based applications such as instant messaging and
VoIP.
The FCC was established during the New Deal to ensure, in the
words of its enabling statute, "a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and
worldwide wire and radio communication service. '69  This is an
awesome scope of responsibility, touching a significant percentage of
66. See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 7-145 (1999) (describing the
evolution of the ARPANET and its transformation into the Internet); Werbach, supra
note 32, at 13. "Neutral interconnection" meant that every connected network was
treated as a "peer," responsible for carrying any traffic handed off to it.
67. See infra Part II.A.
68. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
69. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2000)). The FCC expanded on the responsibilities of
the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC"), which was set up seven years before to oversee
the airwaves. While the FRC regulated only radio, the FCC had authority over all forms
of interstate "communication by wire or radio." Id.
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the U.S. economy. Yet the FCC has a smaller budget than many
other administrative agencies in Washington, D.C.7" Although
communications has exploded in market size and importance, the
FCC went from an initial 233 staffers in 1934 to roughly 2,000 today,
giving it fewer employees than the Internet startup Google at the time
of its initial public offering.71
Nonetheless, this little agency is the target of frequent vitriol and
condemnation. Descriptions of the FCC frequently paint it as either a
hulking ogre meddling in everything from morality to antitrust or a
bureaucratic backwater specializing in obscure rules and
anachronistic regulation.7" It is no wonder the computer industry is so
fearful of being swept up in its maw. The reality, however, is that the
FCC has regulated the computer industry ever since there was a
computer industry.
The discourse around technology policy is prone to hyperbole
and scare tactics. It is important, therefore, to be clear what it means
to say that the FCC functions as a Federal Computer Commission.
Neither computer manufacturers, nor Internet access providers, nor
companies such as Amazon.com, Yahoo!, and eBay that operate over
the Internet, are subject to all the FCC's economic and public interest
mandates in the same manner as telephone companies, cable
television operators, television broadcasters, and mobile phone
operators. On its face, the Communications Act applies to a limited
set of entities, such as telecommunications service providers.73 Most
computer and Internet companies fall under FCC mandates
indirectly, often in ways they do not consider regulation. The fact
that a device is subject to some level of FCC oversight is not
necessarily a threat to innovation and business agility. Conversely,
though, the absence of those harms should not mask the existence of
regulatory involvement.
70. For example, President Bush's Fiscal Year 2006 budget calls for $304 million in
funding for the FCC, compared to $7.6 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency,
$1.4 billion for the Food and Drug Administration, $888 million for the Securities and
Exchange Commission, $702 million for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and $331
million for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/
fy2006/pdf/budget/tables.pdf.
71. See Verne Kopytoff & John Shinal, Google IPO Raises $1.2 Billion, $85 a Share,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 2004, at Al; Museum of Broadcast Communications, Federal
Commc'ns Comm'n, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/F/htmlF/federalcommu/federal
commu.htm (stating that 233 federal employees worked at the original FCC). Moreover,
Google, in contrast to the FCC, is continuing to expand its staff.
72. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
73. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
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Computing and communications intersect in several places. As a
consequence, the relevant FCC rules derive from separate strands of
legal authority and policy objectives. The four pillars of the Federal
Computer Commission are: (1) rules regulating interfaces of phone
(and, to a lesser extent, cable TV) networks, which in effect regulate
devices using those interfaces; (2) mandates concerning radio
frequency emissions, which increasingly apply to devices better
described as computers than radios; (3) decisions designed to achieve
social policy mandates, which in application regulate the computer
industry; and (4) proceedings targeted at particular Internet
applications, specifically VoIP and instant messaging.
These requirements serve many different policy goals. In
telephony, for example, the FCC regulated hardware to separate
devices from the regulated network. In broadcasting, by contrast, it
regulated hardware to keep devices joined with, and dependent on,
networks. The Part 68 rules promoted competition in the end-user
equipment market, while the V-Chip addressed public policy
concerns about violent television programming. The diversity of FCC
computer-oriented rules contributes to the ignorance about the scope
of the Federal Computer Commission. Each person perceives only
the small portion of the elephant he touches.
A. Computers Invade the Phone Network
The domain of the wired telephone network is where the seeds
of FCC computer regulation were most clearly planted. In its Part 68
terminal attachment rules, the Commission took control of the basic
interfaces for connecting computers to data networks. In the
Computer Inquiries, it defined the terms of engagement between the
regulated world of telephone companies and the innovative world of
computer-based applications.
1. The Battle Over Terminal Attachments
It all started with a rubber cup.74 In 1921, an entrepreneur
named Tom Carter began selling the Hush-A-Phone, a cup shaped
silencer that slipped over a telephone mouthpiece.75 A Hush-A-
Phone user could talk into a phone without others nearby hearing
what she was saying. At the time, this was an exciting new feature for
74. Cf RICHARD H.K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 190 (1994) ("Deregulation began more or less with a
rubber cup.").
75. See id.; Mike Sandman Enters., Telephone History Pages, http://www.sandman
.com/telhist.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Telephone History Pages].
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telephone callers. Some 125,000 Hush-A-Phone units were sold.76
There was just one problem: AT&T and its affiliated companies held
a legally protected monopoly over telephone service in most of the
United States.77 AT&T rented phones to customers and prohibited
them from connecting their own equipment. Any such device,
whether a phone or simply an add-on to a phone, was a proscribed
"foreign attachment" under AT&T's tariffs.78
When AT&T discovered the Hush-A-Phone, the phone
monopoly notified the manufacturer and its distributors that the
device was a prohibited foreign attachment. In response, Hush-A-
Phone filed a complaint with the FCC in 1948. There was reason for
optimism. Just a year before, the Commission had determined that
attachments for recording phone conversations must be permitted
because they had no negative impact on the network.79
Hush-A-Phone was not so lucky. Its complaint took seven years
to work its way through the Commission. Finally, the agency reached
its conclusion: the Hush-A-Phone was "deleterious to the telephone
system and injures the service rendered by it."8 The cup muffled the
76. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266,267 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
77. See VIETOR, supra note 74, at 174. AT&T and its affiliates, together known as the
Bell System, held a monopoly on long-distance service, as well as on local service
throughout most of the country. Id. Independent companies, such as GTE, provided local
service in a few markets. Id. at 222. The Bell System monopoly came under fire from
MCI in the 1970s, and from the United States Department of Justice, which filed two
antitrust suits. Id. at 205-07. Finally, in 1982, AT&T agreed to a consent degree breaking
up the Bell System. The Modification of Final Judgment, which split AT&T into a
competitive long distance carrier and seven regional local carriers, set the road map for
the migration toward a competitive telecommunications market. See id. at 211-14.
78. The persistence of the foreign attachment restrictions should give pause to those
who argue that broadband operators will have appropriate incentives to allow higher-level
applications, devices, content, and services to take advantage of their platform. Cf. Yoo,
supra note 60, at 50-53 (arguing that companies could choose not to allow competitors
access without hurting competition). This viewpoint tracks the arguments of Chicago
School antitrust theorists, who attacked the notion that a monopolist is likely to engage in
anticompetitive leveraging into adjacent markets. See id. at 50. Based on this analysis,
AT&T had nothing to gain from dominating the phone equipment business, for which
network interconnection was an essential input. Yet AT&T fought foreign attachments
tooth and nail for decades until its eventual 1968 defeat in the Carterfone decision. See
infra text accompanying note 87. And in the years since that decision, not only has the
competitive market produced a vibrant equipment market generating higher revenues and
innovation than the captive AT&T system would have, but an even greater array of
secondary markets has developed on top of those devices.
79. Use of Recording Devices, 11 F.C.C. 1033, 1055-56 (1947). The FCC did express
concerns about privacy. Id. at 1050. In the case of the recording devices, unlike Hush-A-
Phone, there was not even an allegation that the attachment would degrade conversations
on the network. Id. at 1043-45.
80. Hush-A-Phone, 238 F.2d at 268.
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speaker's voice slightly, producing a softer and slightly distorted
sound on the other end of the line. In other words, it did harm the
network, so AT&T could proscribe it.8
Hush-A-Phone was the high water mark of the FCC's willingness
to defend the AT&T monopoly and stands as a symbol of the
perverse consequences of that stance for competition and innovation.
Viewed in another light, though, the decision reflects significant
willingness by the FCC to intrude in the market for end-user
equipment. Hush-A-Phone was not a communications company; it
was a hardware vendor. It plugged into the network in exactly the
same way as today's personal computers. And yet it could not
continue to market its product because of a decision of the
Commission.
Thankfully, Tom Carter did not give up. Hush-A-Phone
challenged the FCC decision in court. And the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit handed down a landmark decision
that paved the way not only for competition in end-user
communications hardware but also for the Internet and other
information services we find so important today.82 The court
acknowledged that AT&T's tariffs were "just and reasonable" to the
extent they actually prevented harmful consequences for phone
company employees or the general public.83 However, it rebuked the
FCC for finding any such harm. The only arguable harm of the Hush-
A-Phone was degradation of sound quality for the other party in the
conversation.' Other users of the phone network were completely
unaffected." AT&T and the FCC, the court held, had no business
protecting callers from themselves.86
Eventually, the FCC shifted its views in the court's direction. In
1968, Tom Carter challenged AT&T's refusal to allow another of his
inventions, the Carterfone, to connect to the phone network. The
Carterfone was a device that patched landline phone calls into a two-
way radio conversation. This time, when the issue came before the
FCC, Tom Carter found a more receptive audience. The FCC not
only rejected the application of the Bell tariffs to bar use of the
81. The Commission reached a similar conclusion with regard to an early telephone
answering machine, the Jordaphone, refusing to invalidate foreign attachment tariffs
unless state regulators authorized their use specifically for local calls. See Jordaphone
Corp. v. AT&T, 18 F.C.C. 644,669-71 (1954).
82. Hush-A-Phone, 238 F.2d at 269.
83. Id. at 267.
84. Id. at 268.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 269.
[Vol. 84
FEDERAL COMPUTER COMMISSION
Carterfone; it struck down all foreign attachment restrictions in those
tariffs as contrary to the public interest.87 In their place, the
Commission developed a set of technical rules known as Part 68.88
The Part 68 rules define the basic technical specifications for
interconnecting with the telephone network. They specify, for
example, the wiring of a phone jack.89 Any manufacturer can review
the Part 68 specification, design a compliant device, and self-certify
that it meets the technical requirements for interconnection.90 As the
story is usually told, Carterfone was a watershed moment in the
deregulation of telecommunications. It was a decision against the
disastrous Hush-A-Phone path of regulating end-user devices.91
Histories of communications policy point to Carterfone as a key
foundation for the eventual breakup of the AT&T monopoly and the
competitive opening of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.' More
recently, cyberlaw scholars have pointed to Carterfone as the
foundational decision protecting what ultimately became the Internet
from regulation.93
In reality, Carterfone merely shifted the locus of device
regulation. Before Carterfone, AT&T and its affiliated companies
decided what could be attached to the network in the form of their
tariffs and their decisions about how to enforce them. After
Carterfone, what could be connected to the network was defined by
the technical standards in Part 68 of the FCC Rules. In other words,
the technical and business decisions about which devices to permit
moved from the private sector to a government agency.94 Granted,
87. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420,425 (1968).
88. Connection of Terminal Equipment to the Telephone Network, 47 C.F.R. § 68
(2005).
89. Id. § 68.105(a).
90. 2000 Biennial Reg. Review of Part 68 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regs., Report &
Order, FCC-00-400, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,944 IT 94-106 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Biennial
Review].
91. See LESSIG, supra note 57, at 30, 148.
92. See VIETOR, supra note 74, at 191-93; cf Farrell & Weiser, supra note 63, at 93-94
(citing Carterfone as a milestone in the development of competition in
telecommunications); Telephone History Pages, supra note 75 (highlighting the
significance of the Carterfone).
93. See LESSIG, supra note 57, at 149.
94. The Commission itself acknowledges that Part 68 is, on its face, regulation of
hardware manufacturers but notes that the primary burden of those regulations falls on
phone companies. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 90, 7 ("Thus, although our Part 68
rules appear to establish elaborate requirements for terminal equipment manufacturers,
the fundamental obligation that the rules impose is on the local exchange carriers-they
must allow Part 68-compliant terminal equipment to be connected freely to their
networks.").
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that agency exercised its stewardship with a light hand and developed
standards that allowed the industry to proceed generally as it saw fit.
But from 1968 on, the FCC was the decisionmaker for any devices
that depended on connectivity to the public switched telephone
network. The Federal Computer Commission was born.
The FCC would ultimately define the terms of interconnection
with the public switched telephone network for more than thirty
years. Only in 2000 did the Commission formally transfer
responsibility for certification and standards definition to a private
body.95 By then, however, the relationship between the computer
industry and the government regulator was completely ingrained.
Part 68 defined technical standards from the phone network out.
Simply striking down the Bell foreign attachment tariff provisions
would not have accomplished much. Some terminal equipment could
indeed harm the network by, for example, interfering with billing
systems, degrading service to unrelated customers, or exposing
telephone company personnel to the risk of electric shocks. Without
government-defined standards, the phone companies could be
expected to continue challenging individual pieces of terminal
equipment. The FCC had to tell the phone companies exactly what
sort of equipment to accept. Doing so, however, meant defining
standards for interfaces. And interface standards point in two
directions. They tell the provider on one side (here, the phone
company) what to permit, and they tell the provider on the other side
(the equipment manufacturer) what to build.
The Part 68 regime required manufacturers to register any
equipment to be connected to the telephone network.96 That
registration originally could be obtained only by approval of the
Commission.97 The Commission later allowed designated private
certification bodies to function as alternate sources of approval for
equipment registration. 98 Finally, in 2000 it eliminated its own role in
the process. 99 Terminal equipment manufacturers must now either be
certified by an approved certification body or file a "supplier's
declaration of conformity," a binding statement that the device meets
the applicable technical requirements.1" Those requirements
95. Id. 49-57 (setting forth the purpose of the Administrative Council for Terminal
Attachments).
96. 47 C.F.R. § 68.102 (2005).
97. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 90, at 2.
98. Id. 11-12.
99. Id. 2.
100. Id. T 3.
[Vol. 84
FEDERAL COMPUTER COMMISSION
themselves are now managed by private industry-led groups with the
FCC only involved if a party challenges the legitimacy of the
specifications."'
Again, calling the post-Carterfone regime a form of computer
regulation does not mean it was more restrictive or intrusive for
prospective device manufacturers than the prior arrangement. It
demonstrably was not. Moreover, by removing decisionmaking
power over network attachments from the dominant carrier,
Carterfone paved the way for the later development of additional
devices and services that did not carry voice phone calls at all. They
would connect instead to a new kind of device: a personal computer.
Apple began selling the first mass market PC in 1977.1' That
same year, Dennis Hayes introduced the personal computer modem
to modulate and demodulate a digital communications signal over an
analog phone line. 103 Modems were originally developed for U.S.
military air defense communication in the 1950s, and AT&T Bell
Labs produced the first commercial modem in 1962.1° These were
expensive units for businesses to hook up to their mainframe
computers. Not until Apple and Hayes came along did the modem
become a consumer device.
From the computer's perspective, the modem is the network
endpoint. A software application running on a PC, such as a Web
browser, is several steps removed from the phone network. The
browser vendor, let alone the Internet-based applications such as
Amazon.com and Google that appear through that browser, never
need to consider the terms of network interconnection. From their
perspective, connectivity is a given with government nowhere in the
picture. Yet this freedom would not be possible without the FCC-
defined Part 68 rules at the end of the chain.
Thanks to relentless improvements in chip performance and
miniaturization, the analog modem virtually disappeared as a stand-
alone device in the late 1990s. Modems today are usually built into
PCs, either as separate internal components or as purely software-
based functions leveraging the computer's general signal processing
101. Id. 2.
102. Henry Knorr, Growth of a Silicon Empire: Bay Area's Fertile Intellectual Ground
Helped Sprout High Technology Industry, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 27, 1999, at D1.
103. Dennis Hayes, The Humble Modem, DATA COMMS., Oct. 21, 1997, at 80; Ripley
Hotch, PC, Phone Home, NATION's Bus., Feb. 1990, at 36.
104. The device, the Bell 103, ran at a whopping 300 bits per second. Most PCs today
ship with built-in 56 kilobit per second analog modems, which operate nearly 200 times
faster. Introduction and History of Modems, http://www.dementia.org/-juliedltele2lOO/
intro.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
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capabilities. Costs are so low, and demand for data connectivity is so
great, that PCs today rarely ship without a built-in modem. So, for all
intents and purposes, the modem is the computer. The computer is
the terminal attachment subject to the technical standards process the
FCC set in motion in Carterfone.°5
2. The Computer Inquiries and Open Network Architecture
Where the terminal attachment rules dealt with computers at the
outside edges of the phone network, the Computer Inquiries
concerned computers inside the network. Beginning in the 1960s,
phone companies and independent firms began to integrate data
processing equipment into the telephone system. For example, a
computer could be used to send structured data messages between
two companies across the network, something known as electronic
data interchange. Or it could be used to record and play back phone
messages.
Such applications raise different issues than those considered in
Carterfone. Part 68 dealt with terminal equipment that could be
attached transparently to the network. Such equipment treats the
phone network as a black box: an abstract delivery pipe and nothing
more. However, some computer-driven services require deeper
integration with the network. The phone system incorporates many
105. Most FCC regulation of wired computer interfaces concerns the telephone
network. However, in at least one area, similar obligations apply to the hardware
associated with cable television service. Section 629(a) of Telecommunications Act,
adopted in the 1996 overhaul, requires the FCC to offer consumers the ability to purchase
"navigational devices" separately from their cable company or other multi-channel video
programming provider. 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2000). In other words, the Commission is to
ensure the possibility of a third-party retail market in TV set-top boxes, analogous to the
retail market in equipment connected to the telephone network. In order to achieve this
goal, the FCC had to define technical standards just as it had with Part 68. See
Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Commercial
Availability of Navigation Devices, 13 F.C.C.R. 14,775 passim (1998).
Differences between cable and telephony, however, made the process more
complicated. Because cable TV is a paid service subject to significant levels of fraud, the
set-top box also serves as a conditional access device that verifies a subscriber is entitled to
service and to the particular programming package the subscriber has purchased. Because
cable uses a shared distribution architecture, every cable subscriber receives premium
channels such as HBO and Pay-Per-View programming over the wire. The set-top box
blocks subscribers who have not paid for that programming from ever seeing it.
Enabling an independent market for set-top boxes, therefore requires industry
standardization of security mechanisms as well as technical standards for separating these
security functions from other aspects of the navigation device that can be competitively
provided. So far, although some set-top boxes are available at retail, the results in price
reductions and innovation have been nothing like that experienced in the end-user
telephone equipment market.
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,supporting features and systems for billing, signaling, and network
monitoring. Today, for example, there is a separate signaling system
that sets up and manages calls parallel to the network that actually
carries those calls. Such "out-of-band" signaling provides many
benefits for carriers and also enables vertical features such as call
waiting, voicemail, and caller ID, which are sold as premium services.
An independent company seeking to deliver similar services
needs access directly into the signaling network. The outward-facing
technical standards of Part 68 are not enough. Moreover, the data
processing equipment involved in providing these services straddles
the boundary defined in Carterfone. If a phone company provides a
computer-enhanced service, such as voicemail, is it operating as a
regulated service provider or as an unregulated network attachment
provider? Even though the same service can be provided both inside
and outside the network-voicemail competes with answering
machines, for example-the two situations raise distinct regulatory
issues.
The FCC wrestled with these questions in a long and complex
series of decisions called the Computer Inquiries.10 6  The
Commission's first attempt, the 1970 Computer I decision,1°7
distinguished "communications" from "data processing" functions. 8
The division proved unworkable because computer processing was
increasingly part of both activities. The Computer IP09 regime, first
adopted in 1980, created a new framework separating unregulated
"enhanced services" from the regulated "basic services." 10  The
primary distinction was that enhanced services involve processing
functions that "act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar
aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or
106. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,529-30 (proposed Mar. 7, 1995) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64) (recounting the history of the Computer Inquiries); Cannon,
supra note 5, at 199.
107. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services (Computer 1), 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (final decision and
order).
108. See generally id.; Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d
291, 295-96 (1970) (tentative decision); Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11,
17-18 (1966) (notice of inquiry).
109. Second Computer Inquiry (Computer I1), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
110. Id. at 387 (1980).
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involve subscriber interaction with stored information." '' In 1996,
Congress ratified the FCC framework, creating analogous statutory
categories of "telecommunications" and "information services." ' 2
Computer II required "structural separation" for the enhanced
service offerings of AT&T, at that time still the dominant monopoly
phone company. AT&T and its affiliated Bell companies could offer
enhanced services only by establishing formally separate subsidiaries.
By requiring these unregulated subsidiaries to purchase the necessary
basic services at arm's length from the regulated carrier,
anticompetitive practices could be prevented.
Like Part 68, therefore, Computer II was an attempt to draw a
bright line between computers and the network. The telephone
business could not be combined with the enhanced services business.
Unlike Carterfone, however, the FCC in Computer II did not inject
itself into the standards process. It used a structural remedy to
substitute for direct regulation of computers and their interfaces. In
contrast to the pre-Carterfone foreign attachment regime, the carriers
had a strong incentive to deal. They could only offer enhanced
services themselves if they made the necessary functionality available.
Computer II lasted only six years.113  The basic/enhanced
dichotomy proved successful and was preserved in future decisions.
Structural separation, however, was problematic. It constituted a
significant regulatory intrusion into the business operations of AT&T
and required the company to duplicate personnel and facilities
between the regulated carrier and unregulated affiliate."' While
Computer H was in effect, AT&T agreed to divest the Bell Operating
Companies and open the long distance market to competition. With
the Reagan Revolution in full swing, the thrust of FCC policy moved
toward deregulation.
In Computer III, launched in 1985, the FCC sought to replace
structural separation with a set of nonstructural safeguards, allowing
the Bell companies to offer enhanced services on an integrated
basis."5 In other words, the same company could sell both regulated
basic services and unregulated enhanced services. The primary
safeguard against anticompetitive behavior in this situation was
Comparably Efficient Interconnection ("CEI"). Under CEI, the
111. 47 C.F.R. § 64,702(a) (2005).
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (43).
113. Computer II was superseded by Third Computer Inquiry (Computer Ii), 104
F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order).
114. Cannon, supra note 5, at 199-200.
115. See Computer 1II, 104 F.C.C.2d at 958.
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Bells had to detail every element of basic service functionality they
were providing to their own enhanced services operations and make
that same functionality available on a comparable basis to unaffiliated
companies.'1 6
The FCC intended CEI to be an interim step. 17 The long term
solution it envisioned was Open Network Architecture ("ONA"), the
analogue of Part 68 for network-based computers. ONA meant that
the Bells would break down their network into functional building
blocks that they would make available on a tariffed basis. Third
parties could combine those building blocks and incorporate them
into their own enhanced services regardless of whether the Bells
themselves offered equivalent services. The FCC itself would not set
technical standards but would oversee private forums where the Bells
and independent enhanced service providers ("ESPs") could
negotiate.
Like Part 68, therefore, ONA indirectly regulated computers
connected to the telephone network. Unlike Part 68, which
empowered end-users, that regulation protected service providers.11 8
Through ONA and the Computer III rules more generally, the
Commission influenced the technical interfaces those services use to
connect to the network. However, it does not get involved in the
connections between those (unregulated) service providers and their
(also unregulated) customers. Moreover, because ESPs function as
network users, they need not rely on the Computer III procedures.
They can simply purchase tariffed service offerings, such as high
speed data lines, in the same manner as any business.119
ONA proved contentious in practice. ESPs complained that the
Bell companies were not making available all the functionality they
needed or were surreptitiously advantaging their affiliated operations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the
ONA rules in 1994, finding that the Commission had not offered
116. Id.
117. It was mistaken. The CEI rules remain in effect today, although in a limited form.
118. From a conceptual standpoint, those service providers are "users" of the phone
network's basic service functionality. This is the foundation of the "ESP exemption,"
under which enhanced service providers need not pay the inflated "access charges"
imposed on long-distance carriers. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d
682, 711-22 (1983) (mem. op. and order); Werbach, supra note 32, at 50.
119. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d at 711-22; Werbach, supra
note 32, at 50. Some ESPs may require particular functionality inside the network, which
requires use of the ONA process or a special tariff. However, Internet service providers
generally can use ordinary business lines.
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sufficient justification for lifting structural separation. 121 A
complicated series of orders, further notices, and interim waivers
followed, which has yet to come to a close.12'
B. Computers as Radio-Frequency Emitters
The second thread of FCC computer regulation involves wireless
communication. FCC rules govern every device that emits radio
frequency energy. Although usually described as regulating
"spectrum," the FCC's rules actually apply to equipment used in
wireless communication. Virtually all of that equipment today
involves some sort of computer. In recent years, FCC policies have
evolved to facilitate computer-driven wireless innovations, although
the process remains ongoing.
1. Spectrum Licensing
Around the time Tom Carter started selling his privacy-
protecting rubber cup, another foundational battle was brewing in the
annals of communications regulation. Wireless communication,
based on the late-nineteenth century inventions of Guglielmo
Marconi and Nikolai Tesla, became commercially viable in the first
decades of the new century." The Radio Act of 1912 obligated radio
broadcasters to obtain licenses from the Secretary of Commerce.123
120. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1995).
121. See Computer III, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), on reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035
(1987) (phase I reconsideration order), on further reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988)
(phase I further reconsideration order), on second further reconsideration, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927
(phase I second further reconsideration order), vacated, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217
(9th Cir. 1990); Computer III, Phase II, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987) (phase II order), on
reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988) (phase II reconsideration order), on further
reconsideration, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989) (phase II further reconsideration order), vacated,
California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Computer III Remand Proceedings, 5
F.C.C.R. 7719 (1990), on reconsideration, 7 F.C.C.R. 909 (1992), petitions for review
denied, California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993); In the Matter of Computer III
Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards and Tier I Local Exchange
Company Safeguards, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991) (BOC Safeguards Order), on
reconsideration, dismissed in part, 11 F.C.C.R. 12513 (1996), vacated in part, California v.
FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1050 (1995); In the Matter of
Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of
Enhanced Services, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040 (1988) (further notice of proposed rulemaking),
Computer III Remand Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289 (1999) (review of Computer III and ONA
safeguards and requirements), on reconsideration, 14 F.C.C.R. 21628 (1999) (Computer III
further remand proceedings).
122. See 1 ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN
THE UNITED STATES 12 (1966); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified
Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 868-70 (2004).
123. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (repealed 1927).
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However, two court cases in the mid-1920s essentially stripped the
Commerce Department of the authority to reject license requests,
producing fears of an imminent "chaos of the airwaves. "124
Congress responded with the Radio Act of 1927.125 It definitively
established that the federal government controlled use of the radio
spectrum and that broadcasters could only operate subject to the
approval and terms established by a new government agency, the
Federal Radio Commission ("FRC"). Seven years later, the FRC was
subsumed into a new agency that also had authority over AT&T and
the telephone business: the Federal Communications Commission.126
For nearly eighty years, the FRC and FCC have exercised
dominion over private sector wireless communication in the United
States.127 The primary mechanism of this dominion is the license.
Without a license, no one is permitted to transmit.128 With a license, a
broadcaster can exclude anyone else from interfering with
transmissions in its frequency. 129  Based on this power, the FCC
124. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that
it was the Secretary of Commerce's mandatory duty to issue licenses to persons or
corporations that come within the classification designated in the Radio Act); United
States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (holding that "the Secretary
of Commerce is required to issue the license subject to the regulations in the act" and that
Congress retained the power to prescribe additional regulations).
125. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934).
126. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2000)).
127. See BARNOUW, supra note 122, at 195-201; Yochai Benkler, Overcoming
Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 287, 298-301 (1998); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited
Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's
"Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 335, 360-
73 (2001); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of The Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of
Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 285, 288-89, 299-305 (2004). The FCC has primary authority over private
wireless communications. Government use of wireless frequencies is controlled by the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Department of
Commerce and by the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee with representation
from key federal agencies. For an overview of the mechanics of U.S. spectrum policy, see
Charles L. Jackson, Use and Management of the Spectrum Resource, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 247-71 (Paula L. Newbery ed., 1989).
128. The exceptions are "unlicensed" bands, which allow anyone to transmit, subject to
technical requirements. See Werbach, supra note 122, at 874; Kevin Werbach, Radio
Revolution: The Coming Age of Unlicensed Wireless 16, 25-27 (New America Foundation
and Public Knowledge, 2003), available at http://www.werbach.com/docs/RadioRevolution
.pdf. Technically speaking, though, unlicensed frequency bands are "licensed by rule":
they are subject to license restrictions, but any user is allowed to transmit under those
licenses.
129. Though spectrum licenses were originally developed for radio broadcasters and
point-to-point communications, they now apply for a wide range of wireless services,
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oversees everything from television to mobile phones to satellite
radio.130
At first glance it appears that the FCC regulates the radio
spectrum. In reality, the "spectrum" is just an intellectual construct to
describe how radios traditionally distinguished signals by associating
them with a carrier wave of a defined oscillation frequency."' The
FCC cannot alter the physics by which electromagnetic radiation
propagates through the air between transmitters and receivers. What
the FCC and its predecessor have always regulated are radios.
The FCC regulates wireless communication through the issuance
of licenses. An FCC license is permission to deploy transmitters and
authorize deployment of receivers that conform to the technical
standards defined in the license.13 1 It is a form of hardware
regulation. Today, when virtually every radio incorporates significant
electronics, if not a full-fledged computer, it is tantamount to
computer regulation.
Radio regulation is in many ways more intrusive than the FCC's
rules governing the wired telephone world. There is no such thing as
a radio not "connected to the network," except perhaps a radio that is
turned off. A device that transmits on a certain frequency cannot be
operated if it is not permitted under an FCC-granted license. An
inventor can create a nonconforming piece of terminal equipment so
long as he does not connect that equipment to a phone jack. But that
same inventor cannot turn on a nonconforming radio transmitter, or
she runs the risk of federal marshals or FCC enforcement personnel
physically confiscating it as a "pirate radio."'33 Such restrictions apply
even if no receivers are actually affected by the alleged
interference.' Moreover, radio regulation traditionally defined not
just the frequencies licensees could use but the businesses they could
including television, mobile phone systems, microwave relays for the phone network,
satellite communications, data communications, military radar systems, and global
positioning system satellite navigation.
130. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943). This decision
granted the FCC broad authority to regulate any devices using the radio spectrum. Id. At
the time, that primarily meant radio broadcasting, but the same logic applies to more
recent forms of wireless communication as well.
131. See Werbach, supra note 122, at 868-69.
132. See id. at 923.
133. 47 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2000) (stating that equipment used in unlicensed transmissions
may be seized by the U.S. government).
134. Id.; see David P. Reed, Comments for FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force on




enter.'35 For example, a broadcast license cannot be used to deliver
mobile phone service. More intrusive examples of government
hardware regulation are difficult to find.
The presumption of FCC hardware regulation is so ingrained in
wireless that manufacturers assume FCC restrictions even when none
exist. A group of professors and unlicensed wireless enthusiasts
contacted leading manufacturers of chipsets for wireless fidelity
("WiFi") data devices. 3 6 They requested access to their application
programming interfaces, a standard form of documentation for
programmers seeking to build applications using the chips.'37 The
group's objective was to develop open source software for mesh
networking that can be used to link together multiple wireless nodes
into a single network.
The two dominant chipset vendors both responded that such
disclosure was illegal under FCC rules.'38 Their apparent claim was
that modification of the chipsets would allow creation of rogue
software-defined radios ("SDR"), which could impermissibly impinge
on licensed frequencies.139 As a practical matter, the devices the
group sought to build would not be sophisticated enough to fall under
the FCC's SDR rules, and the FCC regulations at issue cover
hardware, not software. Nonetheless, the incident illustrates how
FCC regulation of "spectrum" turns into pervasive regulation of
computers involved in wireless communication.
135. See Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market
Allocation of Spectrum 4 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Working Paper No. 38, 2002) ("Most
spectrum is currently designated for specific uses or users .... ").
136. Christian Sandvig et al., Hidden Interfaces to "Ownerless" Networks 13-14 (Sept.
2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.spcomm.uiuc.edu/users/csandvig/research/
HiddenInterfaces.pdf. WiFi is a family of protocols for wireless local area networks
issued by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. For information on the
commercial growth of WiFi, see generally Amey Stone, Wi-Fi: It's Fast, It's Here-and It
Works, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Apr. 3, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/apr2002/tc2002041_1823.htm.
137. Sandvig et al., supra note 136, at 13-14.
138. Id. at 17.
139. An SDR is not locked into a specific frequency range or modulation scheme but
can vary its parameters through software commands. William Lehr et al., Software Radio:
Implications for Wireless Services, Industry Structure, and Public Policy 3-5 (Aug. 30,
2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/2002/SoftwareRadioLehr_
Fuencis.pdf.
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FCC licenses only directly cover radio transmitters. 14° There is
no legal prohibition on building a device designed to receive signals in
a different format, much as there is no prohibition on building
terminal equipment that does not actually plug into the telephone
network. However, such a device would have virtually no commercial
possibilities. A television set that cannot pick up television
broadcasts is a glorified paperweight.14' By regulating how
broadcasters transmit, the FCC effectively regulates how receivers
receive.
Because radio interference is in reality a function of how well
receivers distinguish intended signals from other transmissions and
background noise, the interference parameters in the license
effectively create a sensitivity floor for associated receivers. 42 A
viable receiver must be sufficiently sensitive to distinguish signals that
are broadcast in compliance with FCC license terms. Thus, the
primary FCC regulation of radio transmitters generates secondary
regulation of the far more numerous radio receivers.143
In its 2002 Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, the FCC
identified the lack of directly imposed receiver standards as a
problem.'" The indirect floor on receiver performance implied by
the Commission's transmitter standards is only the level necessary to
reliably receive the intended transmission. A poor quality receiver
that passes this test may be abnormally sensitive to out-of-band
signals from unrelated transmitters.'45 The existence of such receivers
can make it difficult for the FCC to authorize new uses of those other
frequencies. In effect, poor quality receivers reduce the useful
140. In fact, the Commission has questioned whether it has the statutory authority to
impose regulation directly on receivers. See Interference Immunity Performance
Specifications for Radio Receivers, ET Docket No. 03-65, Notice of Inquiry (F.C.C. rel.
Mar. 24, 2003), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf=pdf&id
_document-6513982332. On the other hand, the FCC's broad interpretation of its
authority in the broadcast flag proceeding would seem to countenance receiver
performance standards for wireless devices as well. See infra Part III.D.2.
141. This assumes, of course, that the set is used to receive content over the air. The
same television set could function effectively as a cable television receiver, because then
the signals would not be subject to FCC licenses.
142. See Werbach, supra note 122, at 887-93.
143. This is true at least in the case of broadcast services. In a two-way system such as
a mobile phone network, every receiver is also a transmitter.
144. Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, ET Docket No. 02-135 (F.C.C. Nov. 15,
2002), http:/Ihraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542Al.pdf.
145. An out-of-band signal is one that is received in a frequency other than those in
which the licensee is authorized to transmit.
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carrying capacity of the spectrum.146  Recognizing that the
Commission's goal should be to maximize the amount of
communication that can take place over the airwaves, the Task Force
Report sought comment on whether the Commission should impose
performance standards on receivers. 147
Beyond the primary regulation of transmitters and the secondary
regulation of receivers, FCC radio regulation has a tertiary
application as well. The theory behind the regulatory regime for
broadcasting is that broadcasters are given licenses to use the public
airwaves for free to deliver a service that has significant impacts on
democratic discourse. In return, the broadcasters are required to
adhere to a "public interest" standard. They must show they are
serving the public interest in order for their licenses to be renewed. 148
And they are limited in what they can broadcast through, for
example, indecency, children's programming, and political
broadcasting rules. Such deep government intrusions into the content
of speech are rarely tolerated in other contexts. Moreover, they
create a foundation for more recent content-based regulations which
do in fact dictate hardware choices, including the V-Chip and
broadcast flag. 49
As with the terminal adapter rules in the telephone world, the
FCC's radio hardware regulation is not necessarily deleterious. In the
early days of broadcasting, technical rules may indeed have been
needed to prevent a cacophony of competing users. 50  The FCC's
proposed expansion of its licensing requirements to encompass
receiver standards is designed to improve efficiency in spectrum
utilization, thereby allowing more users or service providers access to
the airwaves. 5' However, much of the government's involvement in
wireless has been restrictive rather than facilitative of hardware
innovation. There is an emerging consensus of experts, even joined
146. See Werbach, supra note 122, at 961. The alleged conflict between ultra-wideband
and global positioning systems is an example. See Revision of Part 15 of the Comm'n's
Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Sys., First Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R.
7435 (2002) [hereinafter Ultra-Wideband Order].
147. See Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, supra note 144.
148. At least in theory. The Commission has not denied a license renewal in many
years.
149. See infra Part II.C.2, III.D.2.
150. Even this is not so clear, however. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S.
Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 160-61 (1990) (claiming that a
common law regime for spectrum regulation based on property rights would have
emerged if the 1927 Radio Act had not been adopted); Werbach, supra note 122, at 869-
71.
151. See supra note 140.
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by the FCC itself, that "command and control" regulation of
frequency use produces significant inefficiencies and limits
innovation.1 2 Users and market forces, rather than bureaucrats, can
best determine the uses of the airwaves that maximize social welfare.
2. Unlicensed Wireless
Though frequency-based exclusive licensing remains by far the
dominant mode of radio regulation, the FCC also allows some
wireless communications on an unlicensed basis. 5' In these
situations, the FCC allows anyone to transmit, provided that they
meet technical requirements designed to limit interference. Those
technical specifications are hardware regulations. They operate even
more directly to control equipment manufacturers than the license-
based rules, because the manufacturers must formally seek approval
before they can market their devices. However, as with Part 68 in the
wired world, direct regulation into interfaces and technical standards
corresponds to lighter regulation of the associated services and
applications. The primary regulations involved, Part 15 of the FCC
Rules, date back to 1938, but in recent years the FCC has greatly
expanded their scope.5 4
The Part 15 rules are parallel to Part 68 on the surface. The FCC
defines basic technical standards to ensure that devices do not create
negative externalities for other users and service providers. However,
there are differences. Where Carterfone separated the end-user
device business from the network business, Part 15 eliminates the
need for a network business, allowing devices to connect to one
another without a central service provider. Unlike the privatized
structure that replaced most of the Part 68 requirements after 2000,1"
Part 15 radio manufacturers must still submit their devices directly to
the FCC for certification. 56 Because the threat of rogue wireless
devices interfering with licensed transmissions is seen today as more
152. See Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, supra note 144 (proposing a general shift
away from "command and control" spectrum regulation); Benkler, supra note 127, at 314-
15; Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
269, 271 (2004); Hazlett, supra note 127, at 403-05; Werbach, supra note 122, at 872, 876;
Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets,
and the Commons 19 (2002) (working paper), http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/-faulhabe/
SPECTRUMMANAGEMENTv51.pdf; Eli M. Noam, The Fourth Way for Spectrum
(May 29, 2003), http://search.ft.com/search/article .html?id=030529006357.
153. See Werbach, supra note 32, at 12; Werbach, supra note 122, at 876-78.
154. See 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2005).
155. See supra note 95.
156. Id. § 15.103.
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significant than that of rogue terminal equipment harming the phone
network, the Part 15 approval requirements are both more stringent
and more detailed than those of Part 68.
Significantly, Part 15 also includes rules governing devices that
are not engaged in wireless communications at all.'57 Many pieces of
equipment emit electromagnetic radiation. Even when this radiation
is not designed to send or receive communications signals, it can
interfere with other devices which are trying to do so. In order for the
FCC's wireless rules to achieve their goal of protecting authorized
communications devices and services, they must also cover these non-
communications devices.
There are now millions of Part 15 devices in use-from keyless
entry systems for cars to garage door openers to wireless home
networks.1 18  In particular, sales of WiFi and related unlicensed
wireless data networking equipment are soaring.159 Following the
recommendations of its 2002 Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, the
FCC is expanding the scope of unlicensed operation to facilitate
deployment of new technologies. 6° It was the first communications
regulator in the world to authorize ultra-wideband, an unlicensed
technology that uses such low power that it can coexist invisibly in the
same frequencies as other services.161 The FCC has proceedings
underway to enable other innovations such as software-defined
radio162  and unlicensed underlays in broadcast television
frequencies. 63
Virtually all of these new unlicensed technologies require
intelligent devices with significant computing power. They will be
deployed not just in mobile phones, but in PCs, computer networks,
personal digital assistants, handheld digital music players, and
interactive home entertainment hubs. They will pass down the
familiar computer industry price/performance curve of Moore's
157. These include what the FCC calls "unintentional" and "incidental" radiators. See
infra text accompanying notes 165-71.
158. Kenneth Carter et al., Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White
Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues 1 (FCC Office of Strategic
Planning Working Paper No. 39, 2003), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
DOC-234741Al.pdf.
159. See Gartner Group, Wireless LAN Equipment: Worldwide, 2001-2007 (Jan.
2003), http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?id=366466.
160. See Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, supra note 144.
161. See Ultra-Wideband Order, supra note 146.
162. See Lehr et al., supra note 139, at 18; Authorization and Use of Software Defined
Radios, First Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 17,373 passim (2001).
163. See Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,103,
34,103-34,112 (proposed June 18, 2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 15).
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Law, 164 becoming cheaper and more powerful over time. They will
migrate further into software with adaptive wireless communications
functions tying into applications and content of the relevant devices.
In short, like WiFi, intelligent devices will colonize computers. And
the FCC rules governing their use will come along with them.
The FCC also regulates two categories of noncommunications
devices under Part 15. Unintentional radiators are devices that
generate energy for internal use, such as personal computers.165 The
circuit boards and other components inside the computer manipulate
electromagnetic energy to perform computations. Although such
devices do not intend to radiate that energy externally, they will do so
unless sufficiently shielded. The second category, incidental
radiators, is even further removed from wireless communication. 166 It
includes devices such as electric motors and light switches that
generate electromagnetic fields through the basic physics of their
operation.
Incidental radiators are subject to the general requirement that
they not cause interference with authorized communications
systems.167  Unintentional radiators, which pose a more direct
interference threat, face more significant regulation. Such devices
must either be certified by the FCC, covered by a declaration of
conformity based on measurements by an accredited laboratory, or
subjected to formal self-verification. 68  The requirements vary
depending on whether the device is intended for consumer or
commercial/industrial use. 69
Because PCs are unintentional radiators, they cannot be sold
without carrying an FCC approval seal.170  As a practical matter,
therefore, every personal computer ever made has been subject to
FCC regulation. That regulation may require nothing more than a
self-declaration.' 7' Nonetheless, it is striking that the FCC logo and
authorization appears on each and every "unregulated" personal
164. Moore's Law, named for Intel co-founder Gordon Moore, holds that the
processing power of a microprocessor, at a given price, will double every eighteen months.
It has held true for forty years of computer industry development.
165. 47 C.F.R. § 15.3(z) (2005) (defining unintentional radiators).
166. Id. § 15.3(n) (defining incidental radiators).
167. See id. § 15.13.
168. Id. §§ 15.1, 15.101.
169. See id. § 15.3(h), (i).
170. See Edward A. Yorkgitis, Jr., Personal Computer Equipment Authorization: A
Shifting Regime, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1996, at 22-23. Some PCs are also intentional
radiators, because they incorporate wireless radios. The two sets of rules operate
independently.
171. See 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 90, 1 95.
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computer. And as more computers serve as wireless communications
devices in their own right, FCC involvement will only grow.
C. Computer Regulation as Social Policy
The FCC also regulates computers to achieve social policy
objectives. The Schools and Libraries Subsidy Program and the V-
Chip for blocking certain television programming are two examples
of FCC actions that impacted the computer industry to address broad
"public interest" concerns rather than, as with the wireline and
wireless rules, to ensure smooth economic functioning of markets.
1. Schools and Libraries Subsidies
One initiative that brought together the FCC's social policy
agenda and the computer industry was the Schools and Libraries
Program created by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.172 This so-
called "E-Rate" was a much touted subsidy program for schools and
libraries. Section 254(h) of the Act requires telecommunications
carriers to provide basic telephone services to schools and libraries at
discounted rates. 73 The Commission also has authority to require
that "advanced services" (essentially, high speed data connections) be
available at a discount to schools and libraries.'74
To implement these provisions, the FCC set up a subsidy fund,
capped at $2.25 billion per year, generated through surcharges on
long distance telephone calling.'75 The discounts apply not only to
traditional telephone service but also to Internet access and related
data communications services.'76  Then-Chairman Reed Hundt
172. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6) (2000). Rural health care facilities are also covered. See
id. § 254(b)(3).
173. See id. § 254(h).
174. Id. § 254(c)(3) ("[T]he Commission may designate additional services for such
support mechanisms for schools, libraries and health care providers for purposes of
subsection (h)."); id. § 254(h)(2).
175. See Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and
Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 19, 30 (1999); supra note 40.
176. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 426, at 9003 (1997)
(quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-458, at 132 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.SC.C.A.N. 124, 144);
cf BENTON FOUND., GREAT EXPECTATIONS: LEVERAGING AMERICA'S INVESTMENT IN
EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 18 (Norris Dickard ed., 2002) (assessing the effects of the
E-Rate program); William E. Kennard & Elizabeth Evans Lyle, With Freedom Comes
Responsibility: Ensuring that the Next Generation of Technologies Is Accessible, Usable
and Affordable, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 5, 7 (2001) (defending the E-Rate program).
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championed the Commission's role in connecting classrooms and
libraries to the burgeoning information superhighway.177
The FCC's creation of a significant program to support Internet
connectivity was what led Representative Cox at the 1998 hearing to
attack FCC Chairman Kennard for moving toward a Federal
Computer Commission.178 By interpreting the statutory language
broadly, Cox argued, the FCC set itself up to decide which computer
equipment and services schools and libraries could purchase at a
discount. And by creating a large fund to support these expansive
discounts, the FCC was imposing higher surcharges on consumers'
telephone bills. Though Representative Cox may have had legitimate
concerns about how the FCC was managing the E-Rate program, 17 9
his reference was somewhat fanciful. Subsidizing Internet services is
not the same as regulating them.8 ° And the FCC, as described above,
already exerts great influence over the Internet through other types
of regulation.
There were, however, elements of the E-Rate program that
directly touched the computer industry. The 1996 Act specifies that
schools and libraries receive discounts on telecommunications and
information services."' The program was designed to subsidize
network connectivity, not PCs and other hardware that schools and
libraries might also desire. This created a problem when subsidy
recipients wished to link up to the Internet using unlicensed wireless
connections. There is no "service" needed to communicate between
a WiFi wireless card in a classroom laptop and a base station
177. See Reed Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm., Speech to the National
School Boards Association: Giving Schools and Libraries the Keys to the Future (Jan. 27,
1997), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh704.html.
178. See supra text accompanying note 42-44.
179. The Schools and Libraries Program has successfully disbursed several billion
dollars, and the percentage of classrooms with Internet connections has grown
substantially. However, the program was controversial from the start. See Jessica
Malman, Note, Connecting Students to "The Net": Guiding Principles from State
Constitutions, 7 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 53, 82 n.174 (2000); Shira Levine, E-Rate
Under Fire, AMERICA'S NETWORK, May 15, 2003, at 14. In recent years, it has repeatedly
come under scrutiny for mismanagement and fraud. The FCC took the extraordinary step
in the summer of 2004 of suspending subsidy payments until the problems could be
addressed. See Norman Oder, $40M in E-Rate Funds Suspended, LIBRARY J., Nov. 1,
2004, at 16.
180. One legitimate concern was that Internet service providers would be required to
contribute to the subsidy pool for Schools and Libraries funding. The FCC surcharge
applies only to telecommunications services, not "information services" such as Internet
access. There were arguments, though, that for competitive parity or because the services
being deployed would benefit the Internet industry, it should pay in as well. The FCC,
however, rejected those arguments.
181. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000).
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elsewhere in a school. The hardware itself is the service. 82 Even
though the configuration just described is a direct substitute for a
wired connection between the two points, the FCC concluded that it
could not subsidize the wireless network. 83
The treatment of wireless connections in the Schools and
Libraries Subsidy Program is a case of the FCC excluding computer
hardware because its mandate was limited to network-based services.
The impact, though, was to increase the relative cost to schools of
buying WiFi gear, because the competing wired solution qualified for
the subsidy. Indirectly, therefore, the FCC altered the competitive
dynamics for computer hardware vendors.
2. The V-Chip
The 1996 Act also mandated that all television sets with screens
over thirteen inches manufactured after January 2000 incorporate a
so-called "V-Chip" to allow parental blocking of violent and sexually
explicit programming."8 The FCC oversaw the implementation of the
statutory scheme, which included a ratings system for programming.
With the V-Chip requirement now in force, parents can block their
children from viewing content based on the ratings criteria. Thus,
every television set sold today incorporates a piece of FCC-mandated
hardware, which interfaces with FCC-mandated ratings.
The V-Chip, on its face, applies to televisions, not computers.
That line, however, is blurring.'85 PC vendors are starting to sell
models with built-in TV tuners. Microsoft offers a version of its
operating system, Windows XP Media Center Edition, designed to
control television and other entertainment devices and to display
broadcast television on the computer monitor.8 6  Digital video
recorders, such as TiVo, use general purpose computers with
182. This is a broader trend. See infra Part III.B.
183. Fed.-St. Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., supra note 176.
184. See Technical Requirements to Enable Blocking of Video Programming based on
Program Ratings, ET Docket No. 97-206 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Mar. 13, 1998), http://
fcc.gov/bureaus/engineering-technology/Orders/1998/fcc98036.pdf (report and order);
News Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Commission Finds Industry Video Programming
Rating System Acceptable; Adopts Technical Requirements to Enable Blocking of Video
Programming (The "V-Chip") (Mar. 12, 1998), http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News-
Releases/1998/nrcb8003.html; see also J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip and the
Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1156 (1996) (suggesting that as
filtering devices such as the V-Chip become more effective, content restrictions should
become more suspect).
185. See infra Part III.A.
186. See Windows XP Media Center 2005 Home Page, http://www.microsoft.com/
windowsxp/mediacenter/default.mspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
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specialized software to record and control TV programming. A raft
of new Internet Protocol Television ("IPTV") offerings from start-
ups as well as larger players promises to deliver a vast array of TV
content over broadband Internet links directly to TV sets or local
storage devices.1" Although the Commission took pains to
emphasize that only devices capable of receiving traditional over-the-
air broadcast programming were subject to the V-Chip requirement,
that still includes PCs with TV tuner cards or other mechanisms
allowing them to receive TV broadcasts.1"
The V-Chip is both hardware regulation and content regulation.
It requires equipment manufacturers to incorporate something into
their hardware, and it places limits on broadcasters' ability to deliver
programming to viewers. The FCC's authority to mandate it derives
directly from the 1996 Act, so the Commission did not need to allude
to its more general regulatory authority over broadcasting. 18
9
However, the nature of the regulation-protecting children from
inappropriate content-directly parallels preexisting FCC rules to
enforce the public interest obligations of broadcasters. 190  The
difference is that the target is no longer just broadcast licensees;
computer manufacturers are swept into the ring as well.
D. Application-Directed Computer Regulation
In at least two cases, FCC regulation of computer applications
has been direct and explicit. Both involve software functionality
delivered through the Internet. In 2001, the FCC imposed conditions
on the AOL-Time Warner merger relating to instant messaging,
based on concerns about anticompetitive behavior in this nascent
Internet-based market. In 2004, the Commission issued two
187. See Jay Greene, Microsoft May Be a TV Star Yet, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 7, 2005, at
78; John Markoff, New Service by TiVo Will Build Bridges from Internet to the TV, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2004, at Cl; Global IPTV Revenue Predicted to Top $17 Billion by 2010,
BROADCAST ENGINEERING ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2005, http://broadcastengineering.com/
newsletters/bth/20050123/iptv-revenue-global-20050123/index.html; David Short, The
Many Facets of IPTV, BROADCAST ENGINEERING ONLINE, Jan. 1, 2005,
http://broadcastengineering.com/magbroadcasting-facetsjiptv/index.html.
188. Courtney Macavinta, FCC Approves PC-TV V-Chips, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 13,
1998, http://news.com.com/FCC+approves+PC-TV+V-chips/2100-1023_3-209031.html.
189. This distinguishes the V-Chip from the Commission's subsequent decisions to
require digital TV tuners and a broadcast flag for digital programming. See infra Part
III.D.2.
190. In this way, the V-Chip parallels the All-Channel Receiver Act, which directed
the FCC to regulate television sets in order to protect UHF broadcast licensees. See infra
text accompanying note 289.
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declaratory rulings and launched two rulemaking proceedings related
to VoIP, also known as "Internet telephony."
The distinguishing characteristic of these actions is that they
involve regulation not of network infrastructure, but of specific
functionality provided through digital computer networks. In other
words, not only do these rules apply to activities traditionally in the
domain of unregulated information services, but they also involve
direct regulation of software. 9' Infrastructure regulation could
perhaps be explained away as an outgrowth of the FCC's traditional
activities, but software regulation is something new. These are
therefore the clearest examples that the perceived "no regulate zone"
around the computer industry is illusory.
These two steps went largely unremarked upon in the computer
industry. Both decisions stemmed directly from existing FCC
mandates-antitrust review in the IM case, telecommunications
regulation for VolP. Furthermore, the application-specific nature of
these decisions makes them appear idiosyncratic. Regulating a
particular application because of its particular market characteristics
may seem less rapacious than regulating devices which can be used to
provide a wide range of applications. The IM rules were further
limited in their direct application to a single vendor, AOL.
Nonetheless, the Commission's actions belie claims that software
markets are removed from the reach of government regulators.
1. Instant Messaging Interoperability
The FCC's foray into instant messaging took place in the context
of a merger review. The Commission is required to review all
mergers that involve transfers of FCC licenses."9 It has the power to
block transactions or to impose conditions that the merged company
must fulfill. AOL's blockbuster acquisition of Time Warner involved
transfers of cable television licenses, bringing the matter under FCC
review. 93
191. See Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1163,
1163-66 (1999) (providing a general discussion of computer applications and the Internet's
layered architecture).
192. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2000). The Commission's merger review authority exists
in parallel with antitrust review by the United States Department of Justice and, in some
cases, the Federal Trade Commission.
193. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547 1 (2001) [hereinafter AOL-Time Warner
Merger Order].
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Although its merger review authority derives from the transfer of
licenses, the FCC is not limited to imposing conditions linked to those
licenses. Instead, it can broadly consider the competitive implications
of the proposed transaction. In analyzing the AOL-Time Warner
deal, therefore, the Commission was not limited to considering
competitive effects on the cable market. At the time, one of AOL's
fastest growing services was IM. IM is an Internet-based software
application, typically using a stand-alone desktop client, that allows
users to exchange messages with a designated list of recipients.
Unlike email, the messages appear on the recipient's screen
immediately after they are sent, and the IM software includes
"presence" capabilities to indicate when other users are online and
logged into the service. There are roughly 275 million IM users
worldwide." 4
When the FCC reviewed the merger in 2000, AOL controlled
sixty-one percent of the IM market through its own AIM service and
the similar ICQ service it obtained from an earlier acquisition. 95
AOL refused to open the interfaces to its IM products, meaning that
users of competing IM products could not communicate with AIM
and ICQ users. 96 Time Warner did not offer its own IM client.
However, concerns were raised that, by establishing a digital media
colossus that dominated both Internet access and content markets,
the AOL-Time Warner merger would create anticompetitive effects
in the nascent IM market.197 A particular rationale for the concern
was the sense at the time that IM would be the basis of lucrative new
communications services, incorporating not just text messages but
voice and video. 8
194. See Verne Kopytoff & Benjamin Pimentel, Yahoo, Microsoft Link Instant
Messages, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2005, at C1.
195. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee; Petition of AOL Time Warner Inc. for Relief from the Condition
Restricting Streaming Video AIHS, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,835 6 (2003) [hereinafter IM
Removal Order]. Microsoft had the next largest market share, 22.2 percent, followed by
Yahoo! at 19.3 percent. See id.
196. Most other IM providers also refused to interconnect. However, AOL's large
share of the market made its decision the most competitively significant.
197. See AOL-Time Warner Merger Order, supra note 193, at 6552-53; Gerald R.
Faulhaber, Access ; Access1 + Access2 , 2002 MICH. ST. L. REV. 677, 704-05 (2002).
198. See Faulhaber, supra note 197, at 705. Whether because of or in spite of the
FCC's actions, those new IM-based markets developed more slowly. However, they are
now starting to take root. For example, AOL recently announced it would launch a VolP
service tied into its IM software. See James S. Granelli & Chris Gaither, AOL to Offer Net
Phone Service, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at C5.
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In its merger review, the FCC concluded that the IM business
was generally not competitive and that AOL was taking advantage of
its dominant position to thwart IM competition. 199 The Commission
worried that, especially with Time Warner's cable assets becoming
broadband Internet access platforms, a merged AOL-Time Warner
would dominate next-generation "advanced IM-based high speed
services" ("AIHS"). 200 Therefore, the Commission required the
company to interoperate with other IM providers before releasing an
AIHS, either by adopting an open technical protocol or through
private contracts with leading unaffiliated IM providers.2 °' AOL-
Time Warner could escape from this requirement if it could show the
condition no longer served the public interest, that there had been a
material change of circumstances, or that it was no longer a dominant
provider of IM services.2°
As it turned out, many of the perceived benefits of the AOL-
Time Warner combination never materialized because the Internet
bubble began to collapse shortly after the transaction's
announcement in 2000. Nor did the expected AIHS explosion arrive.
IM providers did begin to incorporate rich media capabilities such as
voice and video into their clients, but both the pace of innovation and
the revenue-generating potential of the market were slower to
emerge than anticipated. One reason was that efforts to facilitate
interoperability among the major IM clients proceeded slowly, even
under the shadow of the FCC merger condition. In 2003, Time
Warner successfully petitioned the FCC to remove the IM condition,
claiming changed circumstances and introducing evidence that AOL's
share of the IM market was dropping.2 3
The AOL IM merger condition is striking in that it is
indisputably a case of direct FCC regulation of a software
application °.2 4  This was not a matter of infrastructure regulation
spilling over onto new digital devices, nor a generic social policy
initiative with impacts on Internet-based services. It was a deliberate
attempt to regulate competition in an information services market.
199. See AOL-Time Warner Merger Order, supra note 193, at 6603 129.
200. See id. at 6603 11 128, 130.
201. See id. at 6626 J 187-88.
202. See id. at 6628 195.
203. See IM Removal Order, supra note 195, at 16,837 6. Subsequently, AOL and
competitors have made some voluntary progress toward interoperability. See Jim Hu &
David Becker, IM Giants Drop Some Barriers to Peace, CNET NEWS.COM, July 15, 2004,
http://news.com.comIIM+giants+drop+some+barriers+to+peace/2100-1032_3-5270067
.html (noting progress toward IM interoperability).
204. See Weiser, supra note 49, at 843.
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Then-Commissioner and later Chairman Michael Powell dissented
from the decision to require IM interoperability, arguing that it
represented an unwarranted intrusion into the previously unregulated
Internet realm.2°5  The FCC majority, however, saw AOL-Time
Warner's potential dominance of next generation IM services as a
threat to the very openness and competition that had allowed the
Internet to remain unregulated until then.2°
The IM condition is even more extraordinary in that the
Commission's first foray into Internet application regulation occurred
not in a rulemaking proceeding, with full opportunity for public
comment on proposed Commission decisions, but in the context of a
merger review. The Commission argued that there was insufficient
time for a rulemaking because in the interim, AOL-Time Warner
could consolidate its dominance of IM services beyond the point of
no return.20 7
The FCC's IM regulation efforts lasted only two years.20 1 It is
therefore fempting to view the decision as an anomaly. And indeed,
it is unlikely the Commission would have jumped into the IM market
or Internet applications generally without the forcing factor of the
AOL-Time Warner merger review. The episode, however, provides
some lessons that will be relevant to future FCC computer regulation
in other areas.
First, the Commission justified its authority to regulate IM based
on its broad ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the
Communications Act.209 Although the Commission has rarely relied
on this expansive yet vague authority, it did not hesitate to do so in
the IM context, even though it was entering an industry where it had
previously disclaimed intent to regulate. Second, the Commission
viewed the IM market similarly to the telephone industry it had
regulated since its inception. Both are network industries,
characterized by strong tipping potential once a dominant provider
205. See Application for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses by Time
Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc. Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc.
Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6701 (2001) (mem. op. and order) (statement of Commissioner
Michael K. Powell).
206. See AOL-Time Warner Merger Order, supra note 193, at 6603 129.
207. See id. at 6625 186.
208. See IM Removal Order, supra note 195, at 16,835 1. This was an important
change since the original order was the elevation of Michael Powell, a critic of the original
decision, to FCC Chairman, with a Republican majority on the Commission.
209. See AOL-Time Warner Merger Order, supra note 193, at 6610 148 (citing 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-170 (2000)).
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emerges.210 The dominant provider in such situations can strengthen
its control by refusing to interconnect with rivals. The solution in
telephony was mandatory "common carrier" interconnection for
AT&T, the dominant firm, in return for protection of AT&T's
monopoly status.21'
The AOL IM condition sought to achieve similar results solely
with an indirect interoperability mandate. Yet the decision had a
number of qualifiers. Only AOL was directly required to make its
service interoperable, it only had to do so if it introduced an AIHS,
and it could interoperate through either an open protocol
promulgated by a standards body or private contracts. In contrast to
Part 68 for terminal attachments, therefore, the Commission felt that
IM interoperability could be achieved without direct government
engagement in the process.2 2
2. Voice over Internet Protocol
VolP straddles the line between Internet application and
regulated communications service. It is a software-defined function
delivered on top of the Internet, and yet, to the end-user, it can
appear identical to traditional telephony.1 3  Consumer VoIP
providers such as Vonage, AT&T, and cable TV operators are
delivering VoIP over broadband access connections in competition
with incumbent phone companies. Those phone companies
themselves are deploying VoIP infrastructure in their networks.
Consequently, VoIP is beginning to put pressure on the economics of
the telephone business.214
Some VoIP services provide specialized hardware to end-users
and incorporate dedicated network links and interconnection points
with the public switched telephone network. Others, however,
operate purely through software residing on a personal computer or
other device.215  The leading example is Skype, a peer-to-peer
210. See id. at 6613-15, IT 153-60.
211. See Burch, supra note 31, at 85.
212. See AOL-Time Warner Merger Order, supra note 193, at 6627, 191.
213. See Review of Regulatory Requirements for IP-Enabled Services, 69 Fed. Reg.
16,193-202 (proposed Mar. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter IP-
Enabled Services NPRM]; Voice Over Internet Protocol: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong. (testimony of Kevin Werbach,
Founder, Supernova Group, LLC), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=1065&witid=2993.
214. See Net Phones Start Ringing Up Customers, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 24, 2003, at 45;
The Phone Call Is Dead; Long Live the Phone Call, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2004, at 6.
215. Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Should Your PC Be Your Telephone?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2004, at G6.
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application that has been downloaded more than 200 million times
since its launch in late 2003.216
The FCC's initial response to VoIP was to stay as far away as it
could from anything that could be considered regulation. When a
trade association of long distance resellers, America's Carriers
Telecommunications Association ("ACTA"), petitioned the
Commission in 1996 to prohibit early VoIP offerings by "non-tariffed
uncertified entities," the Commission sought comment but took no
action.217 Two years later, Senator Ted Stevens, the powerful
chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, attached a
provision to the Commission's budget, pointedly directing the FCC to
justify its nonregulation of VolP. 218 The Commission responded with
an April 1998 report to Congress, known as the "Stevens Report,"
reaffirming its hesitation to impose traditional carrier regulation on
VoIP. 219 The Commission acknowledged that some "phone-to-
phone" VolP services "lack[] the characteristics that would render
them 'information services,' within the meaning of the statute, and
instead bear the characteristics of 'telecommunications services.' "220
216. James Fallows, In Internet Calling, Skype Is Living Up to the Hype, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2004, at B45; Andy Reinhardt, Net Phone Calls, Free---and Clear; Skype's Radical
Technology and Marketing Threaten the Very Foundations of Telecom, BUSINESSWEEK,
Nov. 1, 2004, at 60; Skype, http://www.skype.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (listing Skype
downloads to date); Press Release, Skype, Skype Voicemail and Windows v1.3 Launched
(June 13, 2005), http://www.skype.com/company/news/2005/voicemail_vl3.html (stating
that Skype has over 42 million registered users, increasing by approximately 150,000 per
day and over 1.5 million paying users of its SkypeOut offering).
217. See The Provision of Interstate and International Interexchange
Telecommunications Service Via the "Internet" by Non-Tariffed Uncertified Entities,
America's Carriers Telecommunication Association, Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
Special Relief, and Institution of a Rulemaking, RM 8775 (Mar. 4, 1996), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Other/actapet.html. The Commission has
broad latitude in how to respond to petitions for rulemaking, and in the case it simply did
not proceed with any further action.
218. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 623, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521-22
(1997) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000)). Stevens and other senators were concerned
that, if VolP remained unregulated, it would siphon revenues from "universal service"
funding mechanisms derived from regulated telecommunications revenues. See Universal
Services Hearing, Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Senator Ted
Stevens) ("I am concerned that the continued exemption of information service providers
from access charges, with their inherent contribution to universal service, amounts to a
continued subsidy by other telecommunications users.") (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
219. See Fed.-St. Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, CC Docket No. 96-
45, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, 11,519-25 IT 36-45 (1998) (Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Stevens
Report].
220. Id. at 45 89.
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Nonetheless, it stopped short of a commitment to follow through with
this conclusion in a rulemaking proceeding and stressed that its
statement was tentative and nonbinding.2 21
Not for another six years would the Commission formally take
up the VoIP question. In the interim, the rollout of broadband
networks and the entry of new competitors significantly raised the
profile and competitive implications of VolP. 222 Such benign neglect
was in keeping with the Commission's longstanding hesitancy to
engage in express regulation of competitive computer-based
functionality, variously articulated as the "unregulation" policy 223 or
the "nascent services doctrine."224 It contrasted, however, with the
Commission's willingness to influence the nascent IM platform in the
AOL-Time Warner merger order.2 z
Moreover, VoIP is not just a new computer-based capability that
can easily be distinguished from traditional regulated
communications services; it can be a direct substitute for those
services. The Commission's reticence to address VoIP, while it may
well have been justified, was therefore not a simple case of resisting
the temptation to expand into the computer industry. VoIP
represents the computer industry invading and potentially subsuming
the communications industry. 26 Whatever the ultimate outcome, it
was always clear that the FCC would at some point have to address
VoIP. 227
In February 2004, the Commission finally adopted two VoIP
decisions. The first was a declaratory ruling concerning Free World
Dial-Up ("FWD"), a VoIP service provided by pulver.com. 221 The
Commission concluded that FWD, which charged no fees and offered
no guaranteed interconnection with the public switched telephone
221. See id. at 45-46 IT 90-91.
222. See IP-Enabled Services NPRM, supra note 213, at 16,194.
223. See Oxman, supra note 5, at 25.
224. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Comm'r, Fed. Commn'cns Comm'n, Remarks Before the
Federal Communications Bar Association New York Chapter: The Nascent Services
Doctrine (July 11, 2002), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/20O2/spkqa217.html.
225. See supra Part II.D.1.
226. Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 37, 45 (2002).
227. The Commission's prolonged silence on VoIP created uncertainty among industry
participants and investors, and fostered conflicts when incumbents sought to collect fees
from VoIP providers that applied to other carriers. See Kevin Werbach, Time to Regulate
VoIP, VON MAG., Nov-Dec. 2003, http://www.vonmag.com/issue/2003/novdec/columns/
werbach.htm.
228. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is
Neither Telecomms. nor a Telecomms. Serv., 19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 3324 (2004).
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
network, was an unregulated information service, not a regulated
telecommunications service.2 29  The second action was a notice of
proposed rulemaking on IP-Enabled Services."3 In that proceeding,
the Commission squarely raised the welter of regulatory issues that
VoIP engendered, including whether to impose common carrier
obligations and universal service funding obligations.2 1 Later in 2004,
the FCC took three other actions relating to VoIP. It declared
AT&T's VoIP transport service, which transparently routed
traditional phone traffic using VoIP protocols, a telecommunications
service subject to regulated interstate access charges. 32 It launched a
proceeding to consider VoIP providers' obligations under the
Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"),
which requires telecommunications carriers to make their networks
amenable to lawful wiretaps.233 And it declared voice over broadband
offerings, such as Vonage, subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction,
preempting state attempts to apply traditional common carrier
regulation.'
In 2005, the Commission went still further. It issued an order
requiring "interconnected" VoIP providers to offer enhanced 911
("E911") capabilities to their customers.235  E911 allows telephone
subscribers in an emergency to directly connect to a local public
safety switchboard by dialing 911, while automatically transmitting
location information the public safety dispatcher can use to send
police, fire, or other personnel to the scene. Traditional telephone
companies are required to implement E911 capabilities. The FCC
reasoned that since VoIP can be a substitute for such telephone
services, it should also face such obligations: "[t]he record clearly
indicates, however, that consumers expect that VoIP services that are
interconnected with the PSTN [public switched telephone network]
229. See id.
230. See IP-Enabled Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 4863,4917-18 (2004).
231. See id. at 4892-4915.
232. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone Telephony
Servs. are Exempt from Access Charges, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457, 7472 (2004).
233. See Commc'ns Assistance to Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 15,676, 15,707-10 (2004) [hereinafter CALEA NPRM].
234. See Vonage Holdings Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order
of the Minn. Public Utils. Comm'n, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 22,432 (2004).
235. See IP-Enabled Servs., 74 (F.C.C. June 3, 2005) [hereinafter IP-Enabled Servs.],
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/attachmatch/FCC-05-116Al.pdf. The
Commission defined "interconnected" VoIP services, a new category not derived from any
statutory language, as "those VolP services that can be used to receive telephone calls that
originate on the [public switched telephone network ("PSTN")] and can be used to
terminate calls to the PSTN." Id. 24.
[Vol. 84
FEDERAL COMPUTER COMMISSION
will function in some ways like a 'regular telephone' service. '236 Thus,
a broadband application utilizing Internet protocol data transmission
from end to end is subject to the same requirements as a regulated
Title II circuit-switched telephone company. Although the
Commission's decision was limited to such "interconnected" VoIP
services, the definition leaves significant room for interpretation.237
Unlike IM, the FCC never expressed concern about the
competitive dynamics of the VoIP market itself. Rather, its interest
stemmed from a conviction that VoIP would have significant
competitive effects on the traditionally regulated telecommunications
industry and might in fact converge with that industry. Nonetheless,
VolP is not a communications service tied to a particular
infrastructure; it is a software layer on top of the Internet.2 8 From a
technical standpoint, the Skype VoIP client is identical to the ICQ IM
client or the Microsoft Internet Explorer Web browsing client. FCC
regulation of VoIP is therefore inherently a form of computer
regulation.
Thus, in virtually every area in which it operates, stretching
decades into the past and up to the present day, the FCC has engaged
in regulation of computer-based industries. Contrary to popular
belief, FCC regulation of personal computers, other computing
hardware, software applications, and data networks is not a new
prospect. It is a well established tradition. There may be no entity
officially called the Federal Computer Commission, but the computer
industry is subject to a host of legal requirements overseen by an
agency with the acronym FCC.
III. THE FUTURE: FCC INSIDE
To this point, one could plausibly acknowledge the FCC's history
of regulating computing devices and still believe it to be a dying
anachronism. FCC actions in previous decades took place amid a
backdrop of pervasive regulation and government protected
monopoly. That has gradually disappeared, replaced by a policy that
236. Id. 23.
237. In August 2005, the Commission applied the same formulation to wiretapping,
ordering "interconnected VoIP providers" to comply with the Communications Assistance
to Law Enforcement Act. See Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act, 69
Fed. Reg. 56,976 (Sept. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 22, 24, 26); FCC First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Communications
Assistance to Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services. ET Docket No.
04-295 (adopted Aug. 5, 2005, released Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/FCC-
05-153Al.pdf [hereinafter CALEA Order].
238. See supra note 213.
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favors market forces wherever possible."' Perhaps the Federal
Computer Commission is a vestige of the old proregulation order,
which will fade away as market competition breaks out everywhere in
the communications world.
The truth is otherwise. Surprising as it may sound, the FCC is
actually poised to increase its involvement in computer-based
businesses. The reason is not a revanchist movement to restore the
good old days of Hush-A-Phone. Technology itself is the cause for
the coming growth of the Federal Computer Commission. The
evolution of computer and communications technologies is blurring
lines that once distinguished devices from networks and is increasing
the importance of end-user hardware in controlling network
connections. The same innovations that allow for new competition-
and thus deregulation-in traditional communications markets are
posing new regulatory challenges that demand a response from the
FCC.
240
FCC decisions are playing an important role in key market
developments involving the Internet and digital media. The
Commission is becoming something like the semiconductor giant
Intel, a powerful force in computing that is often invisible to end
users. To build its brand, Intel launched a huge marketing campaign
with the slogan "Intel Inside." The coming era of convergence and
user-defined networks will be an era of "FCC Inside."
Several factors will support this solidification of FCC computer
regulation. The long term technology trend towards convergence of
computing and communications means the historically distinct
computer industry will move ever closer to the FCC's "home"
regulatory turf. Specifically, as intelligent end-user hardware plays an
increasingly important role in defining applications flowing across
communications networks, FCC regulation of those networks will be
harder to distinguish from regulation of the constituent devices.
Business dynamics in the information technology world will further
reinforce these trends by pushing Internet and information
technology companies further into the communications world.
239. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1350-58 (1998).
240. Former FCC Chairman Michael Powell appreciated this fact, although he had
little success in denting the prevailing myth of FCC unregulation. See David Kaut, FCC
Commissioner Ponders Extent of Regulation Among Rivals on Internet, 77 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 417, 417 (1999) (quoting then-FCC Commissioner Michael
Powell as stating that "if you don't believe that [current] regulatory choices ... have a
direct and indirect effect on the development of the Internet, you're really missing
something."). I am indebted to Phil Weiser for pointing out this quote to me.
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Finally, public policy impulses to address issues such as intellectual
property and law enforcement will push the FCC still further into the
world of computer regulation.
A. Two Aspects of Convergence
The most basic reason to expect further FCC involvement in the
computer industry is the phenomenon of convergence. To put it
simply, the gap between the "unregulated" computer world and the
"regulated" communications world is shrinking.
The term "convergence" is heavily laden with baggage. A
thousand business plans were launched on the premise that all forms
of information and entertainment are becoming interchangeable,
undermining the legal and business distinctions among formerly
distinct platforms such as broadcast television, mobile telephony, the
telephone network, and cable television. While these grandiose
dreams proved premature, convergence is a very real phenomenon.
Convergence has at least two distinct meanings, which are often
conflated. 41 The first is what former FCC Chairman Michael Powell
liked to call "the digital broadband migration." '42 When translated
into digital form, all information is theoretically interchangeable. The
bit, the fundamental unit of digital communications and processing, is
universal.243 A data network that carries documents can also carry
pictures and voice conversations and any other type of media. This
contrasts with analog networks, which are hard-wired for a single
service. Every major communications technology has been engaged
in a digital migration over the past two decades. Telephone
networks, broadcast television, cable, radio, and mobile phone
networks are all shifting from analog systems to digital
transmission.24
The implications of the digital migration for communications
policy are profound. Networks that once did not-and could not-
compete with one another, such as the telephone and cable wires into
houses, suddenly become competing platforms for digital broadband
241. See Werbach, supra note 32, at 5-6.
242. See Michael K. Powell, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks Before the
Progress and Freedom Foundation: The Great Digital Broadband Migration (Dec. 8,
2000), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2000/spmkp003.html.
243. C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communications, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J.
379-423, 623-56 (1948), available at http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/
shannon 1948.pdf.
244. In some cases, such as digital television and radio, the transition is still in progress.
Digital broadcasts are available, but the majority of users still tune into the old analog
offerings.
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applications. Different regulatory obligations apply to seemingly
identical service offerings because of legacy rules tied to the physical
network.245 Markets once considered doomed to monopoly or
oligopoly enjoy new competitive possibilities because digital
broadband platforms lower barriers to entry and transform cost
structures. And a raft of new functionality becomes available to end-
users.
There is, however, a second aspect of convergence. Computers
are converging with communications devices. Where the digital
migration concerns the information, content, applications, and
services delivered through communications networks, the second
aspect of convergence concerns the equipment involved. Historically,
computers were self-contained data processing devices, while
communications equipment was connected, but not very sophisticated
or adaptable. In other words, computers were smart but lonely, while
communications devices were social and dumb. A telephone was
basically a microphone and audio amplifier, while a radio was a
glorified tuning fork.
Today, computers are ubiquitous in communications networks.
From end-user equipment to the switching, billing, and monitoring
functions deep inside the infrastructure, it is difficult to find a corner
of the communications world today where computers do not play a
leading role. A "basic" mobile phone handset sold today has more
processing power than a stand-alone personal computer not long
ago.2' It typically includes speed dialing, address books, calendaring,
text messaging, downloadable ringtones, screen savers, games, and
other application functions. It also uses digital signal processors and
other sophisticated hardware to receive signals effectively and
economize on power.247
At the same time, computers are becoming communications
devices. Virtually every PC has an analog modem port and an
Ethernet port; a majority of new laptops also include WiFi and/or
Bluetooth wireless radios as well.248 Microsoft includes a full Session
Initiation Protocol VoIP communications software stack in the
245. See Werbach, supra note 226, at 57-64 (proposing a "layered model" of
communications policy to address these asymmetries). Myself and others have proposed a
"layered model" of communications policy to address these asymmetries. See id. at 57-64.
246. See Dominic White, ARM Optimistic of Where Chips Will Fall in Digital Age,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 20,2004, at 30.
247. See Brad Stone, Your Next Computer, NEWSWEEK, June 7,2004, at 51.
248. See Dean Takahashi, WiFi Stands Alone, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 24,
2004, at 1C ("In 2003, 31 percent of laptops had WiFi built-in. This year, about 61 percent
are expected to have it, according to IDC.").
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current version of Windows. 249 VoIP softphone applications such as
Skype allow users to make phone calls using only their PC, and IPTV
platforms turn PCs into sophisticated television receivers. ° And this
does not even include the millions of personal digital assistants,
smartphones, and other devices which deliberately blur the line
between communications and computing. A Treo from PalmOne, for
example, is capable of sending and receiving email, browsing the
Web, instant messaging, playing music clips, taking and displaying
photos, managing calendars, and running game software. Yet this do-
it-all computer is marketed primarily as a phone.
We are not so far away from a world in which every end-user
personal computer is also a communications device and every end-
user communications device is a computer. Chipsets, input/output
subsystems, and radio components are becoming so cheap that they
look virtually free to device designers. Intel and other major
semiconductor vendors are working to integrate and miniaturize
qommunications components so that they can be incorporated into
chipsets with minimal overhead. Any device that at some point may
benefit from connections to the outside world will therefore be
capable of communication, and any device that may benefit from
flexibility and sophistication will therefore be capable of
computation. 1
As with the other elements of convergence, this development is
both exciting and perplexing. In a world of limited overlap between
computers and communications, it was possible to ignore the
overhang of FCC regulation on computing devices. If FCC rules
affect virtually all end-user computers, that is much less feasible.
The FCC is like a grand old hotel built many yards inland from a
beach. Over time, as the beach erodes, the water creeps closer to the
hotel until it reaches the edge of the property. The hotel has not
grown or moved at all; the water has come to it. The bulwarks that
once divided the regulated world of telephone companies and
broadcasters from the unregulated paradise of computers and
Internet applications are collapsing.
249. See Neal Shact, The Era of Always-On, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2004,
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom-era-alwayson/.
250. See supra text accompanying note 187.
251. See Kevin Werbach, It's in the Chips, FEATURE, July 8, 2002, http://www
.thefeature.com/article?articleid=15350.
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B. Hardware-Defined Networks: God's Box as Pandora's Box
The second development that will raise the tension over FCC
regulation of computers and data networks flows from the first.
When communications devices were relatively unsophisticated, they
had to depend on sophisticated, centralized networks. The
paradigmatic communications networks of the twentieth century-the
public switched telephone network and television broadcasting-both
adopted this model.252 The PSTN grew and developed around room-
sized mainframe computers called switches, which controlled traffic
and managed other functions across pieces of the network.
Television depended on high powered signals emerging from tall
broadcast towers. If there was any sophisticated computing in these
networks, it was built into the core infrastructure.
Today's intelligent end-user devices make possible a different
network architecture. Smart devices can connect to one another
directly, without the mediation or control of centralized
infrastructure.2 3 This architecture is sometimes called peer-to-peer,
but it is broader than that. It means networks are defined not by
service providers, but by end-users and the devices they operate.
These networks are therefore customer- or hardware-defined.
VoIP, for example, is changing the nature of telephony by
transforming voice phone calls from a service baked into the network
into a class of applications that can run on any platform. VoIP
connections run on top of broadband Internet links. There is always
a computer in the mix, whether managing the broadband connection,
embedded in the phone-shaped device that plugs directly into a data
line, or running VoIP software such as Skype that supports calling
directly through the PC.
Computer hardware and software thus become the "carrier" of
the VolP communication. This shift is ultimately forcing the FCC to
consider whether and how its many rules governing
telecommunications apply to VolP.2 4 The Commission has not
completed the IP-Enabled Services proceeding that will address these
questions and may not for some time.2 5 It seems unlikely, however,
252. See David Isenberg, The Rise of the Stupid Network, http://www.rageboy
.com/stupidnet.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
253. See Benkler, supra note 127, at 322-26.
254. See IP-Enabled Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4917-18 (2004).
255. The departure of Chairman Powell in March 2005 will delay most complex or
controversial FCC decisions, and the new Chairman Kevin Martin will need time to get up
to speed. Nonetheless, the FCC did adopt the VolP E911 protocol in the first months of
Martin's Chairmanship. See IP-Enabled Servs., supra note 235, 2.
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that the outcome will be a complete reaffirmation of the hands-off
approach of the ACTA petition and the Stevens Report. With major
incumbent providers deploying VoIP, a blanket decision not to
regulate this new software application would be tantamount to
deregulating much of the established telecom industry. And in the
VoIP E911 Order, the FCC has already decided that at least some
VoIP services should comply with at least some forms of traditional
telephone regulation.256 The Commission will therefore have to come
up with an approach that is neither underinclusive nor overinclusive.
It seems committed to avoiding excessive or unnecessary burdens on
the computer industry and data networks, merely because they enable
functionality that resembles traditional telephony. This goal,
however, creates conflicts with other equally powerful FCC
objectives.
The growth of unlicensed wireless communications is also
expanding the importance of hardware-centric networks. Like VoIP,
unlicensed wireless connections do not require a network operator in
the center. Anyone can use the available spectrum capacity without
the approval of a license holder. Individual devices can communicate
with one another and relay traffic on a peer-to-peer basis and can link
together with other devices in a "mesh" configuration. 7 Just as the
Internet has no central service provider ensuring that information
gets to the right place, a mesh wireless network can operate in a
decentralized fashion. Users simply need a device capable of
connecting to the network.
In San Francisco, California, a project called SFLAN is building
a carrierless, hardware defined wireless network among volunteers
who place access points at their houses or offices.258 Each volunteer
can share a wired broadband connection among users in range of the
wireless signal, essentially creating a "commons" based on
community contributions. 9  The key is that connectivity exists
wherever a contributor places the necessary access point hardware.
The devices, not service providers, determine the reach of the
network. Various other commercial and noncommercial projects
around the world are using similar approaches.26
256. See id. 4.
257. See Steven M. Cherry, Broadband a Go-Go, 40 IEEE SPECTRUM 6, 20 (2003);
Glenn Fleishman, Take the Mesh-Networking Route: Mesh Networks Offer an Agile, Cost-
Effective Alternative, INFOWORLD, Mar. 10, 2003, at 24.
258. See Jason Ankeny, Brewster Kahle, Founder, SFLan, WIRELESS REV., Mar. 1,
2004, at 3; SFLAN, http://www.archive.org/web/sflan.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
259. See Benkler, supra note 127, at 326-28.
260. See Cherry, supra note 257, at 20-25; Sandvig et al., supra note 136, at 4.
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Hardware-centric networks are not limited to
telecommunications and wireless communication. In broadcasting,
intelligent end-user devices are beginning to substitute for networks
in aggregating and selecting content. The traditional role of a
broadcast or cable network vis-A-vis content is to choose certain
programs to make available and to package those programs for
consumption by users, typically on a set matrix of channels and times.
A television set does not define what a viewer can watch and when; a
broadcaster or cable operator does. A computer with a hard drive
connected to the network can usurp that function.
Digital video recorders ("DVRs") from vendors such as TiVo
record television programming based on user selections from an
electronic program guide or algorithms designed to identify content
appealing to the user. They also give users the ability to pause and
rewind live TV by recording automatically in the background. TiVo
has over three million customers for its market-leading DVR, either
under its own brand or through licenses to other hardware vendors.2 61
In addition to stand-alone competitors, cable and direct broadcast
satellite providers are selling set-top boxes with DVR functionality
built in.262 Microsoft's Windows Media Center Edition also includes
DVR capabilities.263
Although DVR penetration is still relatively low, the devices
have captured both popular imagination and the attention of
broadcasters worried that users will skip through commercials. 26 Led
by the Apple iPod, analogous handheld devices giving users greater
control over music and other audio content are selling briskly.265 The
next evolution will be for these devices to incorporate Internet
connections. 266  At that point, the device is no longer just a new
261. See Mike Musgrove, TiVo Subscribers Top 3 Million Milestone, WASH. POST, Feb.
19, 2005, at El.
262. See Cliff Edwards, Interactive TV: What's in the Cards?, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 31,
2005, at 32.
263. Jay Greene, Microsoft Sharpens Up Its Elbows; It's Taking on TiVo in TV Digital
Recording and Google in Web Searches, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 22,2004, at 125.
264. FCC Chairman Powell, a TiVo user himself, called the device "God's machine" in
remarks at a conference. See Warren St. John, Friend or Foe? The Cult of TiVo Cometh,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, § 9, at 1. He was rebuked by the broadcast industry for
supporting the destruction of its business model.
265. See Andy Serwer, It's iPod's Revolution: We Just Live in It, FORTUNE, June 27,
2005, at 43. Apple recently added video capability to the iPod, opening up an additional
frontier for user-controlled media. Richard Siklos, Cool, a Video iPod. Want to Watch
"Lost"?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,2005, § 3, at 5.
266. The primary limiting factor on such developments today is copyright concerns.
See infra Part III.D.2. TiVo has a home media option, which allows users to share content
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interface on television or radio; it becomes the center of an entirely
new form of media. And content-oriented media regulations will
start to apply to devices that share little with the over-the-air
broadcasters who were their original targets. 267
C. Technology Industry Business Dynamics
The computer industry is also moving toward the FCC for its
own technical and business reasons. Though hardware and software
are distinct elements of a computer system and largely separate
industries with diverging economics, the line between the two
domains is not absolute. In many cases, the same function can be
performed either through hardware or software.268 VoIP is an
example of a communications capability that is migrating into
computer software, as vendors seek new sources of revenue and
opportunities to increase the value of their platforms. Skype
softphone software performs the same function as a hardware-based
VoIP phone. Microsoft's XBox gaming console has a headset and
microphone jack. With the optional XBox Live online gaming
service, it can be used for VoIP chats among players in multiplayer
games, even though no one would think of it as primarily a
communications device.269  In another example of market-driven
convergence, Yahoo!, a major Internet content "portal," recently
acquired Dialpad, a VoIP provider, which it sees as synergistic with
its Yahoo! Messenger IM software.27 °
The plasticity of hardware and software makes it even harder to
identify the line between regulated communications networks and the
unregulated computer industry. A computer can turn into a
communications device with the addition of some software and that
between TiVos in a home, and it recently won approval for a service that can distribute
protected content to other personal devices. See Markoff, supra note 187.
267. The broadcast flag is a good example. See infra Part III.D.2.
268. In general terms, software is more adaptable and replaceable than hardware,
while hardware-based systems tend to operate faster. However, special-purpose chips
called Application Specific Integrated Circuits ("ASICs") can be custom-designed to
perform specific application functions, which otherwise would be implemented in software
running on general-purpose hardware. There are also various means of making hardware
more flexible, such as rewriteable memory.
269. In fact, Microsoft is arguably the largest voice over broadband provider in the
United States thanks to the Xbox, with over one million Xbox Live customers as of mid-
2004. Kevin Werbach, Not Your Parents' Phone System, TECH CENT. STATION, Aug. 25,
2004, http://www.techcentralstation.com/082504E.html.
270. See Elinor Mills, Yahoo To Buy Net Phone Services Company, CNET NEWS.COM,
June 14, 2005, http://news.com.com[Yahoo+to+buy+Net+phone+services+company/ 2100-
7352_3-5746926.html.
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functionality can later be incorporated into the device's hardware or
vice versa. The FCC is wrestling with exactly this problem in its
consideration of VoIP. 7' The menagerie of categories it has adopted
in different VoIP-related decisions, none of which seem to apply
beyond the immediate context, reflects this difficulty. Technology
companies will implement functionality in the way that makes the
most sense at any given time, complicating the environment for
regulators.
The computer industry is also finding itself facing questions
about communications regulation because of its own business issues.
The personal computer market is maturing as penetration rates reach
near-saturation levels in most of the developed world and push
against the limits of income levels elsewhere.272 The industry's ability
to improve performance year after year is becoming its own enemy as
users see little reason to upgrade when their existing computer has all
the power for the set of functions they associate with the device. As a
result, companies such as Microsoft and Intel are looking for new
market opportunities that either extend or escape their PC
stronghold.
Microsoft is aggressively moving into markets such as smart
mobile phone operating systems, home media hubs, and voice
communications which have traditionally been subject to FCC
regulation.273  Moreover, as Microsoft becomes more active in
delivering applications or content that ride over broadband
connections to the home, it finds itself potentially at odds with
regulated phone and cable companies that control the "last-mile"
broadband access networks. As a result, Microsoft has become more
active, filing comments in FCC proceedings and meeting with FCC
commissioners to promote its policy views.274 Microsoft is now a
271. See generally IP-Enabled Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004) (examining issues related
to services making use of Internet Protocol and acknowledging the convergence of
services and devices).
272. See generally DAVID BANK, BREAKING WINDOWS (2001) (describing Microsoft's
struggles to continue its growth as the PC industry matures).
273. See John Markoff, Microsoft Is Ready to Supply a Phone in Every Computer, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al (discussing Microsoft's development of voice-based services);
John Markoff, Vision of Personal Computers as Heart of Home Entertainment, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at C1 (describing Microsoft's pursuit of the home entertainment
market); Aaron Ricadela, Gates Sees PC, Cell, and Desk Phone in Communications
"Triumvirate," INFO. WK., Mar. 8, 2005 (discussing Microsoft's real-time collaboration
products).
274. For example, Microsoft was among the organizers of the Coalition of Broadband
Users and Innovators, which pressed the FCC to mandate "network neutrality" for
broadband providers. See McCullagh, supra note 58. Intel was a prime mover in the High
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strong advocate of open communications networks, perhaps
surprising those who view it as benefiting from tight platform control
in its home market. Intel has similarly become more active, especially
on spectrum policy, as it commits significant resources to unlicensed
wireless radio chipsets. 275 These companies and others like them are
finding FCC decisions increasingly strategic to their business future.
D. Growing Public Policy Mandates
As described above, the FCC has long engaged in computer
regulation to serve policy goals beyond basic enablement of
communication. 276 Recently, however, the Commission and Congress
have begun to expand the range of policy objectives that involve
regulation of computer hardware. These policy initiatives generally
relate to industries in transition: broadcast television with the shift to
digital transmission and the telephone industry with the growth of
VoIP and broadband.
The V-Chip was a striking example of a regulatory mandate
designed to achieve traditional public interest objectives in
communications policy-but by imposing requirements on
nontraditional actors. 7  Broadcasters have been subject to content
controls since the dawn of television because of the social importance
of the medium and the fact they received free licenses to use the
public airwaves. Television set manufacturers, on the other hand, are
used to focusing on the quality of the picture, not what that picture
represents. The V-Chip brought the two issues together. Still, the V-
Chip was a narrowly drawn mandate. Though it had some crossover
effects into computer hardware, the rules were circumscribed to
devices clearly functioning as televisions, and the conditional blocking
functionality required was fairly simple and inexpensive to
implement. Most important, the FCC's authority to impose the V-
Chip was clearly spelled out in a congressional mandate.278
The FCC is now venturing into public policy waters further
removed from the congressional life raft. In the digital television
Tech Broadband Coalition, which advocates various polices including light regulation of
new broadband networks. Matt Richtel, Tech Industry Lobbies for More Broadband Use,
S.F. CHRON., June 10, 2003, at B2.
275. See John Markoff, Led by Intel, True Believers in Wi-Fi Say It Will Endure, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2003, at C1.
276. See supra Part II.C.
277. See supra Part II.C.2.
278. The V-Chip was included in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 505, 110 Stat. 56, 136(1996) (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-170 (2000)).
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("DTV") tuner proceeding, the FCC relied on an old law whose
applicability to the requirements imposed was questionable.27 9 In the
broadcast flag proceeding, it was forced to use its generic "ancillary
jurisdiction" to justify a requirement with no direct statutory nexus.28°
In the CALEA proceeding, the Commission proposed to apply to
VoIP obligations that Congress expressly exempted information
service providers from meeting. Finally, in its efforts to craft a
regulatory approach to broadband Internet access, the FCC may have
won judicial blessing for the blankest regulatory slate yet, Title I
infrastructure regulation. All of these requirements have significant
implications for the computer industry.
1. The DTV Tuner Mandate
The FCC's DTV tuner requirements are part of the extended
transition from analog to digital television. In 1996, Congress agreed
to give broadcasters additional spectrum for digital broadcasting at no
charge, while allowing them to keep their current analog spectrum.
The rationale was that only this way could the transition to digital
high definition broadcasting occur without undue disruption to users
and threats to free over-the-air TV. In return for this free spectrum,
valued at the time at $70 billion,281 the broadcasters committed to
rolling out digital TV on a defined schedule. Once the transition was
completed, ostensibly by 2007, the broadcasters were to return their
analog spectrum.282
The pace of digital TV deployment has not matched the schedule
of the 1996 Act. 3  Many broadcasters have upgraded their
transmission facilities and begun broadcasting high definition digital
signals. Those transmissions are useless, however, unless viewers
have television sets equipped to receive them. Standard analog
television sets are incapable of receiving in high definition. Many sets
sold today, especially larger units, are "digital ready." However, even
those sets require a digital tuner, which can either be built into the set
or be part of a set-top box. About twenty-five million TV sets are
279. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
280. See infra Part IV.A.
281. Editorial, A Fix for the Broadcast Giveaway, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2000, at A34.
282. Boob Tubes Going Digital by 2007, REUTERS, Oct. 28, 2003, http://www.wired
.com/news/technology/0,1282,60997,00.html.
283. See Eric A. Taub, Pact Lifts an Obstacle to HDTV Transition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,




sold every year in the United States.28 According to the FCC, there
are eighty-one million TV sets in the United States not connected to a
satellite or cable service, and that consequently will only receive
digital signals over the air.285 Depending on market forces to convert
those sets to digital reception could mean a long wait. And that wait
would slow the return of broadcasters' valuable analog spectrum, not
to mention the other benefits of digital broadcasting.
In order to speed the DTV transition, the FCC adopted a rule
requiring television manufacturers to phase in digital tuners.286
Consumer electronics manufacturers objected strenuously to the FCC
ruling, arguing that digital tuners would add hundreds of dollars to
the cost of a set.287 The FCC, however, argued that prices would drop
as volumes increased, so that the added cost would be minimal
relative to the price of the device. 8
The FCC relied for legal authority on the All Channel Receiver
Act, a statute passed in 1962 to ensure that television sets could
receive both VHF and higher-frequency UHF channels. 289  The
statutory language directed the Commission to "require that
apparatus designed to receive television pictures broadcast
simultaneously with sound be capable of adequately receiving all
frequencies allocated by the Commission to television
broadcasting. '290  The FCC concluded the statute was sufficiently
broad to cover digital channels, even though it was passed decades
before the advent of digital broadcasting.291 The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed, rejecting a
challenge by the Consumer Electronics Association to the FCC's
legal authority.29
284. See Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to
Digital Television, 17 F.C.C.R. 15,978, 16,019 (second report and order and second mem.
op. and order) (separate statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell) [hereinafter DTV
Tuner Order].
285. Id.
286. The phase-in period runs from July 2004 to July 2007, depending on the size of the
set.
287. See DTV Tuner Order, supra note 284, at 15,982.
288. See id. at 15,995.
289. All Channel Receiver Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 15 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 303(s) (2000)).
290. Id.
291. See DTV Tuner Order, supra note 284, at 15,989.
292. D.C. Appeals Court Denies CEA Request to Overturn FCC DTV Tuner Rule, 44
BROADCAST ENGINEERING ONLINE, Nov. 4, 2003, http:/Ibroadcastengineering.com/news/
broadcasting-washington.dc-appeals/.
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In the DTV tuner order, the FCC adopted a far-reaching
mandate on a hardware product that is present in more than ninety-
five percent of American homes.293 It did so to fulfill a congressional
mandate and to effectuate well established public policy goals.
However, it did so on its own initiative. And this action, ostensibly
directed at televisions, will apply to any broadcast TV receiver,
including computers and screens connected to DVRs or Media
Center PCs. As described above, the line between televisions and
computers is blurring and will blur more over time.9
2. The Broadcast Flag
Even more potentially far-reaching was the FCC's "broadcast
flag" mandate. Another barrier to digital TV adoption is content
owners' reluctance to permit programming to be transmitted digitally
to homes. Because a digital stream offers pristine quality and does
not degrade when recorded, movie studios and other content creators
worry that viewers will copy and retransmit their programs in
violation of copyright laws.295 These industries are worried they will
go down the same path as the record industry, which is struggling with
rampant growth of peer-to-peer file sharing networks and other
mechanisms for digital copying of music. Viewers can record TV
programming today, but only at the relatively low quality of analog
broadcasts.296
To address the content owners' concerns, the FCC promulgated
rules requiring broadcasters and TV set manufacturers to implement
293. Among U.S. households, 98.2% have at least one television set. See Media Info
Center, Audience Penetration, http://www.mediainfocenter.org/compare/penetration/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2005).
294. See supra Part III.A (discussing convergence).
295. Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 603, 609 (2004); John Borland, FCC Nears Vote on TV "Broadcast Flag," CNET
NEWS.COM, Oct. 28, 2003, http://news.com.com/FCC+nears+vote+on+TV+'broadcast+
flag'/2100-10283-5097927.html; Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory
Ambition in the Digital Age (February 2005) (unpublished draft, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
296. Content owners also resisted recording of analog broadcasts, via the VCR, when
that technology first became commercially available. Motion Picture Association of
American head Jack Valenti famously likened the VCR to the Boston Strangler. See
Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808,
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1983)
(statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America). The
Supreme Court rejected content owners' entreaties to bar the VCR as a tool of
contributory copyright infringement in the landmark "Betamax" case. See Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
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a "broadcast flag. '297 Like the V-Chip, the broadcast flag involves a
special signal embedded in the broadcast stream, mechanisms for
identifying different kinds of content, and a device in the receiver
capable of interpreting that information. 298 The broadcast flag device
in the receiver prevents the user from recording content if its owner
does not wish to allow such recording.
The FCC was on shakier ground with the broadcast flag than
with the DTV tuner mandate. In requiring tuners, the FCC was at
least mandating digital TV capabilities as a way of fulfilling the
congressional mandate to move toward digital TV. The broadcast
flag actually removed a capability users have today with their
televisions-the ability to record programming on VCRs. It brought
the FCC squarely into a raging dispute about intellectual property in
the digital age, 29 an area where the Commission had not traditionally
been active. Moreover, there was no specific authorizing statute like
the All Channel Receiver Act. Several organizations filed a court
challenge, asserting that the Commission had no authority to
implement such a requirement.300 In May 2005, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed,
vacating the broadcast flag rules as an ultra vires assertion of agency
authority.301
The broadcast flag requirements would have applied to
computers even more so than the V-Chip. The FCC's order specified
that the broadcast flag is required for "Covered Demodulator
Products."3 2 A demodulator is essentially any device that can take a
digital television broadcast signal and display it on a screen.30 3 In
other words, it is a digital tuner. The broadcast flag therefore covered
all digital DVRs, as well as personal computers like Windows Media
Center PCs that have a digital tuner built in. Even mobile phones are
297. Broadcast Flag Order, supra note 35, at 23,552.
298. See supra Part II.C.2.
299. See LESSIG, supra note 57, at 187-88; Heather Green, Are the Copyright Wars
Chilling Innovation?, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2004, at 210; Dan Hunter, Culture War
(Aug. 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
300. Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
301. Id. at 699.
302. 47 C.F.R. § 73.9002(b) (2005) ("No party shall sell or distribute in interstate
commerce a covered demodulator product that does not comply with the demodulator
compliance requirements and demodulator robustness requirements.").
303. Id. § 73.9 0 00(g) (defining "demodulator" as a component, or set of components,
that is designed to perform the function of 8-VSB, 16-VSB, 64-QAM or 256-QAM
demodulation and thereby produce a data stream for the purpose of digital television
reception).
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now becoming digital television broadcast devices30" and could
therefore have fallen under the broadcast flag mandate. Moreover,
emerging "place shifting" software from startups such as Sling
Networks and Orb Networks can seamlessly move digital content
from televisions to other devices such as PCs and phones. °5 If the
FCC regulated devices to ensure effective copy protection for digital
broadcasts, it would have a hard time ignoring such developments.
Perhaps without intending to, the FCC has become a front in the
battle between the computer industry and content owners over digital
copy protection. This is not to say there is no nexus between the
FCC's actions and the identifiable communications policy goal of
digital TV broadcasts, nor is it to assert that the broadcast flag is
necessarily a bad idea.3 6 Both are contestable propositions. What is
not contestable is that a conflict many cyberlaw scholars and major
technology companies consider central to the future of the computer
industry is being waged at the FCC.
The District of Columbia Circuit, at least temporarily, put a halt
to such efforts. However, reading the court's decision as a firewall,
cabining the FCC's regulatory adventures in computerland, would be
a mistake. First, the decision did not reject the broadcast flag per se;
it merely held that the FCC could not adopt it without further
congressional authorization.3 7 The same forces that pushed the FCC
to adopt the broadcast flag in the first place immediately mobilized in
favor of legislation doing just that.308 Something like the broadcast
flag, administered by the very same FCC, could well be mandated for
digital TV transmission. Such a requirement would be more limited
than the earlier broadcast flag, in that an express statutory
authorization would put constraints on the FCC's authority, and
would involve elected officials in the policy deliberations over the
issue. On the other hand, it would serve as express congressional
ratification of the FCC's entry into the digital intellectual property
wars.
304. See Lucas van Grinsven & Astrid Wendlandt, TV for Mobile Phones Almost
Ready for Prime Time, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2005, http://global2.factiva.com/ha/defavlt.aspx.
305. Don Clark, A New Tech Battle for the Home: As Industries Collide and Gadgets
Morph, Consumers Face a Whirl of Choices, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2005, at B4.
306. See Molly S. Van Houweling, Communications' Copyright Policy, 4 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the broadcast flag would have salutary
effects in promoting innovation).
307. See Am. Library Ass'n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("The principal
question presented by this case is whether Congress delegated authority to the Federal
Communications Commission .... 9%
308. See Tania Panczyk-Collins, MPAA To Urge Hill To Reinstate Broadcast Flag,
COMM. DAILY, May 16,2005.
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A close reading of the D.C. Circuit opinion, moreover, belies
expansive interpretations of its significance. Judge Edwards, writing
for the court, concluded the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction did not cover
the broadcast flag for a narrow and technical reason: the flag
operates after the digital broadcast signal is received, not during
receipt of the transmission.309 In other words, there was nothing
wrong with the FCC's expansive regulation of computer hardware as
forms of communications "apparatus." The failing was the particular
mechanism of the broadcast flag, which affected redistribution of
content rather than its initial receipt over the air. In Judge Edwards's
words, "[t]he Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I
plainly encompasses the regulation of apparatus that can receive
television broadcast content, but only while those apparatus are
engaged in the process of receiving a television broadcast. 310
A device that operated while the digital stream was being
received would pass muster under this standard. So, for example, the
FCC could require all covered demodulators to include a chip
disabling video output ports during receipt of digital broadcasts. Or it
could require every covered demodulator to broadcast a unique ID
that it encodes into the digital broadcast stream as a "digital
watermark," allowing unauthorized copies of content to be traced
back. Or the FCC could require a chip that encodes tagged digital
broadcast streams into an encrypted format simultaneously with the
process of decoding and displaying the stream for viewing. The
Commission could not directly require other device manufacturers to
build in digital rights management capabilities for decoding such
encrypted content, because those other devices would not be
"engaged in the process of receiving a television broadcast," but it
would effectively preclude any device without such capabilities from
functioning. Thus, even without congressional action, the FCC's
ability to do something quite similar to the broadcast flag remains
intact.
3. CALEA
Another example of the FCC's growing involvement with
computers to serve public policy goals beyond competition is its
implementation of CALEA. CALEA, passed by Congress in 1994,
was designed to ensure that law enforcement agencies would retain
their ability to intercept phone conversations, subject to legal
309. See Am. Library Ass'n, 406 F.3d at 691.
310. Id. at 692.
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protections such as warrant requirements, in an era of digital
communications.' The FBI was concerned that digital transmission
and encryption would make it more difficult to obtain information
useful for law enforcement. CALEA mandated that telephone
network operators modify their networks to allow law enforcement
wiretapping and established a fund to defray the costs involved.312
CALEA expressly applies only to telecommunications services,
not to information services like Internet access.313 The advent of
VoIP, however, brings CALEA back into the spotlight. Law
enforcement agencies expressed concern that, because VoIP
providers had not previously been made subject to CALEA, VoIP
calls would not be tappable. The Department of Justice and the FBI
lobbied the FCC heavily to extend CALEA to VolP before launching
its comprehensive IP-Enabled Services proceeding in February 2004.
In the end, the law enforcement agencies sent a letter strongly urging
the FCC to address CALEA implications for VolP in the near
future.314
The FCC's CALEA notice of proposed rulemaking, adopted in
August 2004, proposed to require VoIP providers to meet the same
sorts of wiretapping requirements as traditional telephone carriers. 15
In August 2005, the Commission issued an order adopting that
general proposal, although it provided an eighteen-month transition
period and sought further comment on exactly what kinds of
companies would be subject to these new obligations.3"6
The FCC's actions raise as many questions as they answer. As
previously noted, VoIP services need not involve traditional phone
companies in the middle of the network. VolP capabilities can be
built into hardware, software, and computing platforms like Microsoft
Windows and XBox. The FCC attempted to prevent unreasonable
extension of CALEA by distinguishing "disintermediated" VoIP,
311. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000). Earlier statutory provisions required
telecommunications carriers to cooperate with lawful intercepts by law enforcement. See
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). CALEA expanded these requirements in light of the changing
technology of the telephone network.
312. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002.
313. Id. § 1001(8)(C) (excluding information service providers from CALEA
obligations).
314. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Drug
Enforcement Administration, Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking, 22, RM-10865
(Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.askcalea.com/docs/20040311.calea.jper.pdf.
315. See Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 15,676, 15,707-10 (2004).
316. See CALEA Order, supra note 237, 48-52.
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which would not be subject to the requirements.317 Purely computer-
based applications, like Skype, would not have to comply. Though
laudable in intent, this distinction creates yet another regulatory
category with uncertain application to new VolP applications.
The FCC may decide to step back from these proposals in the
implementation and further notice of proposed rulemaking phase of
the proceeding. 318 Even if it does, it will not escape the issues for
long. Like the battle over digital content protection, the controversy
over potential national security risks of the emergent digital
information infrastructure will be with us for some time. Computers
connected to networks are powerful, potentially dangerous tools.
The same capabilities that make them engines of democratization in
countries with repressive regimes also allow them to be used to
threaten democracy in more open environments.
A decade ago, this fundamental cybersecurity question fed the
controversy over U.S. government restrictions on export of strong
encryption technology and the proposal for a government-designed
"Clipper Chip" giving law enforcement back-door access to encrypted
communications.319 The locus of that dispute was the White House
and national security agencies. Today's equivalent, CALEA for
VoIP, is being decided in the halls of the FCC.
4. Brand X and Title I Broadband Regulation
A final example shows how even efforts to limit the FCC's
authority may wind up expanding it. For several years, the
Commission has struggled to develop rules governing broadband
Internet access services. The difficulty the FCC faces is that the
Communications Act prescribes different forms of regulation based
on the nature of physical network connections.3 20 For example,
telephone networks are subject to common carriage and other
obligations under Title II of the Act, while cable television networks
have a completely different regulatory framework under Title VI of
the Act.321 With digital convergence, however, these two networks
can support functionally similar services. Both telephone and cable
317. See id.
318. The FCC's willingness to impose traditional telecommunications rules on VolP
applications in the E911 context suggests such restraint is unlikely. See supra notes 235-37
and accompanying text.
319. Vandana Pednekar-Magal & Peter Shields, The State and Telecom Surveillance
Policy: The Clipper Chip Initiative, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 429,430 (2003).
320. See supra note 226.
321. See supra note 221.
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companies now offer broadband Internet access in the form of digital
subscriber line ("DSL") and cable modem offerings. Under the
FCC's existing rules, however, these competing services face very
different regulatory obligations. Moreover, broadband Internet
access is a very different service and market from either telephone
calls or multi-channel video programming for which those regulatory
obligations were designed.
Recognizing these difficulties, the FCC under Chairman Powell
embarked on an effort to create a new regulatory framework for
broadband. Based on a belief that deregulation would create
beneficial investment incentives, the Commission attempted, in
separate proceedings, to reclassify both cable modem and DSL
services as unregulated "information services." '322 A significant
consequence of the Commission's treatment of cable modem service
was that cable operators were not required to open their networks to
independent Internet service providers, and telephone companies
have been obligated to do for their DSL offerings. In 2003, the Ninth
Circuit overturned the FCC's cable modem classification. In Brand X
Internet Services v. FCC,32 3 the court held that a decision in an earlier
Ninth Circuit case obligated the FCC to treat cable modem offerings
as "telecommunications services. ' 324
In June 2005, the Supreme Court reversed the Brand X
decision." Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas applied the
familiar Chevron3 26 deference standard for reviewing agency decisions
to the FCC's cable modem classification.3 27 He determined that the
322. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 9232 (proposed Feb. 28, 2002) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51)
(concerning DSL service); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3024 (Feb.
14, 2002) (concerning DSL service); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 67 Fed.
Reg. 18907 (Apr. 17, 2002); Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to
the Internet Over Cable Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 18848 (proposed Apr. 17, 2002) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) (concerning cable modem services); Declaratory Ruling and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 50 (Mar. 14, 2002) (concerning cable
modem service). See generally Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking
Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
(forthcoming 2005) (analyzing the FCC's attempt to create a new broadband regulatory
framework).
323. 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
324. Id. at 1132.
325. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2695
(2005).
326. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
327. Nat'l Cable, 125 S. Ct. at 2645.
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Communications Act was ambiguous as to whether cable modem
service constituted "offering" telecommunications functionality,
which would require cable companies to provide unbundled access to
their networks. Given this ambiguity, the majority concluded, the
FCC permissibly decided to treat cable modem service as an
unregulated information service.
For present purposes, this determination was not the most
significant conclusion of the Supreme Court's Brand X decision.
Justice Thomas noted that the FCC had sought comment on whether,
if cable modem and/or DSL services were not subject to Title II's
telecommunications regulation, the agency might be free to fashion a
different set of rules under its Title I authority.3 28 "[T]he Commission
remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based
ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction," he concluded.3 29 Just
what those "special regulatory duties" might entail remains to be
seen. Title I itself contains few, if any, limits. The restriction on
which the broadcast flag case turned-that the FCC's rules may only
apply while communication by wire or radio is taking place-is no
constraint at all for Internet-based networks, applications, and
services, which are by definition engaged in such transmission.
Dissenting in Brand X, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg, pointed out the capacious hole that such Title I
authority could create. The FCC could, he pointed out, apply the
same kind of unbundling obligations it disclaimed under Title II
through the alternate channel of Title I. "This is a wonderful
illustration of how an experienced agency can (with some assistance
from credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic
discretions," the dissent concluded.33 °
The FCC quickly responded to the opening created by Brand X.
It adopted an order in early August 2005 effectively classifying DSL
service offered by incumbent telephone companies as an information
service, no longer subject to Title II unbundling requirements.331 FCC
actions to police anticompetitive behavior by the owners of last-mile
328. Id. at 2698.
329. Id. at 2708.
330. Id. at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
331. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Faciliries, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002)
[hereinafter Appropriate Framework].
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broadband networks will therefore have to arise, if anywhere, out of
the mists of the Commission's general Title I authority.332
In that vein, simultaneously with its decision to eliminate
unbundling obligations on DSL providers, the Commission issued a
policy statement declaring its desire to "preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet. 3 33 The policy
statement lists four principles that the Commission will incorporate
"into its ongoing policymaking activities. ' 334 It is not entirely clear
what this will mean in practice, since the Commission expressly
declined to adopt rules to enforce these principles. However, given
the reclassification of DSL as an information service, the only real
way such principles could be the basis of an FCC decision is through
an exercise of the Commission's Title I authority.
If, as now seems likely, the FCC continues down the Title I path,
classification as an "information service" will mean different FCC
regulation, not deregulation. 33' To reiterate yet again, such FCC
intervention may well produce possible beneficial policy outcomes in
terms of economic efficiency or public interest criteria. It must be
appreciated, though, that the FCC's direction following Brand X
trades statutorily constrained regulation of a limited set of networks
and services for discretionary regulation of a much broader range of
computer-based activities. Virtually every end-user service associated
with the Internet is, under the Brand X decision, an "information
service."
IV. EVALUATING COMPUTER REGULATION
The problem with the FCC's computer regulation is not that it
takes place. It is that there are no standards to guide FCC decisions
about when and how to engage in such regulation. The Federal
Computer Commission exists in the shadows of communications
policy, its very existence routinely denied. As a result, there is no
332. The Commission acknowledged that, if it were to address anticompetitive
behavior by broadband providers, it would do so by exercising its ancillary jurisdiction.
See id. at n.287.
333. See Appropriate Framework, supra note 331.
334. Id. ("(1) [C]onsumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their
choice; (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of their choice, subject
to the needs of law enforcement; (3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of
legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) consumers are entitled to competition
among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers.").
335. See generally Phillip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 55 (2004) (discussing the debate over using Title I as the basis for a
new broadband regulatory framework).
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critical examination of the FCC's decisionmaking process. A closer
look sheds light both on the perils of such unconstrained "mission
creep" and on potential mechanisms to cabin FCC engagement with
the computer world.
In many cases, the FCC had no choice but to include computers
in its rules. Regulation of network interfaces in the telephone
network necessarily implies regulation of the end-user devices
connected to those interfaces. Regulation of wireless communication,
though labeled "spectrum policy," is necessarily regulation of radio
hardware. In other cases, FCC policy initiatives directed primarily at
communications networks spill over to digital devices as with the
broadcast flag and CALEA. The FCC is not consciously trying to
regulate computers. That is, however, precisely what it is doing.
We should get over our hang-ups about the big, bad FCC killing
the goose that laid the golden technology industry. After
acknowledging that the FCC does regulate computer hardware and
applications, the next step will be to identify patterns and common
concerns running through the Federal Computer Commission's
actions. There may not be a grand theory that incorporates all past
and future decisions. Existing communications policy scholarship is
as relevant to FCC actions governing the computer industry as any
other rules. If, in fact, FCC computer regulation continues to grow in
importance, it will eventually become communications policy.
Nonetheless, it is possible to make some initial normative
comments about the Federal Computer Commission. One key issue
concerns the scope of FCC authority. Because the FCC has
disclaimed any interest in overseeing the computer industry, it has
never had to consider how much involvement in that industry is too
much. The risk is that a narrow decision will open the door to
confusion and mischief in the future. The broadcast flag proceeding
in particular shows the dangers of regulating computers indirectly. A
second important question is how the Federal Computer Commission
will fare in light of the current reevaluation of basic tenets of
communications policy. The "layered model" for reconceptualizing
communications regulation in the digital age provides a hospitable
framework for considering future computer regulation.336
336. The layered model analyzes communications policy issues based on distinct
"layers" of network-based functionality. See Werbach, supra note 226, at 57-67.
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A. "Instrumentalities, Facilities, Apparatus, and Services"
The FCC's recent decisions open the door to significantly more
unconstrained involvement in the computer industry. This is because
the Commission is forced to call upon its most capacious statutory
authority to justify its decisions. And that authority may be quite
capacious indeed. In the future, the Commission and those it affects
may find it difficult to pull back and distinguish appropriate from
inappropriate interventions.
Buried deep within the Communications Act are three seemingly
innocuous provisions that potentially give the FCC legal authority to
regulate computers in virtually any way it chooses. First, the end of
the definitions section includes a provision clarifying the scope of "all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio" subject to
FCC jurisdiction.337 Second, under 47 U.S.C. § 153(33), the FCC's
authority includes all incidental "instrumentalities, facilities,
apparatus, and services" used for the "receipt, forwarding and
delivery of communications. ' 338 That provision has been interpreted
as giving the FCC "ancillary jurisdiction" over matters not expressly
defined in the statute, but "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of [its] various responsibilities. 3 39 Finally, 47 U.S.C.
§ 154(i) is a broad catch-all clause allowing the FCC to make any
rules necessary for execution of its functions, so long as they are not
inconsistent with the remainder of the statute.34 °
Read together, these are strikingly broad provisions. The
Commission can adopt any "necessary" rule "reasonably ancillary" to
a responsibility involving "instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and
services" associated with "communication by wire or radio." Every
computer with a network connection would seem to be included. At
first glance, ancillary jurisdiction might seem to apply only where the
nexus between the explicit statutory authority and the intended
action was clear. However, the Commission used that language to
justify original regulation of cable television in the 1960s, well before
Congress passed a law governing cable.341 Even though cable was
337. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000).
338. Id. § 153(33). It is worth noting that, Judge Edwards's opinion in the broadcast
flag case notwithstanding, this language concerns not just the initial receipt of the
transmission but also subsequent forwarding and delivery, which the broadcast flag was
designed to limit.
339. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
340. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) ("The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such
rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be
necessary in the execution of its functions.").
341. Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 181.
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neither a telephone service covered under Title II of the
Communications Act nor a wireless broadcast service under Title III,
the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority to regulate it in
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.34z
The Court's logic in Southwestern Cable was that an unregulated
cable industry would undermine the FCC's existing regulatory
structure for broadcasting. Given the rapid convergence of
computing and communications, the same argument can be made for
a wide range of computer-based services. Unregulated VoIP might
undermine the regulatory structure for basic telephone service.
Unregulated copying of digital broadcast programming could
undermine the regulatory structure for digital television.
Unregulated use of peer-to-peer file sharing software on a Media
Center PC could have exactly the same effect. Unregulated
implementation of protocol in Microsoft's new version of Windows,
which will be used for various communications functions, could
undermine FCC rules as well. It is difficult to see where the slippery
slope ends.
Similarly, the "instrumentalities" clause of § 152(33) might be
limited to actual communications equipment, such as broadcast
transmission towers. The Commission, however, took a broader view
in the broadcast flag proceeding.' The FCC and Department of
Justice's brief in support of that decision asserted that the
instrumentalities clause gave the FCC jurisdiction over any hardware
"associated with the overall circuit of messages sent and received" via
communications. 3" It is notable that, before the broadcast flag
decision, the FCC never directly regulated a class of end-user
consumer electronics hardware without an express statutory
direction. The D.C. Circuit's decision limited the Commission's
ability to regulate such devices, but did not preclude such regulation
so long as it is contemporaneous with the receipt of communications
streams.
B. Hardware Regulation in a Layered World
Communications regulation was traditionally built around a
series of service-based vertical silos. Telecommunications was subject
to one regulatory regime, broadcasting to another, cable TV to yet
342. Id. at 181.
343. Broadcast Flag Order, supra note 35, at n.74 (relying on the "instrumentalities"
provision of the Communications Act for authority).
344. Brief for Respondents at 17, Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (No. 04-1037).
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another, and so forth. This stovepipe approach to regulation made
sense in the days when each service was tied to its own type of
network. With the digital migration, however, applications are no
longer linked to networks. They can compete against similar
applications delivered over different infrastructures.
In this environment, the old vertical categories become an
impediment to sound decisionmaking. The FCC is forced to regulate
based on service classifications, which imply a laundry list of
obligations, even if many are not appropriate. Meanwhile, a single
offering such as broadband Internet access is subject to very different
regulatory treatment depending on the company that provides it.
Critical "interface regulation" questions, such as whether to require
"network neutrality" for broadband access providers, are difficult to
fit into this vertical paradigm.345
An alternative approach is to frame regulation based on the way
networks actually operate. Engineers describe data networks in
terms of layers: elements of functionality that stack on top of one
another.346 Instead of vertically integrated silos, data networks
operate through open interfaces that connect different levels of
functionality. Regulators can similarly think in terms of horizontal
layers. By assigning functionality to layers such as physical (basic
transport infrastructure), logical (routing and addressing),
applications (software functionality for end-users), and content
(information going in and out of those applications), regulators can
move beyond artificial distinctions based on legacy environments.
This "layered model" has become a leading proposal for reforming
communications policy. 47
The layered model is a framework; it need not dictate specific
policies or outcomes.348 Where it does help is in distinguishing
different types of questions and highlighting issues that would
otherwise be overlooked. In the case of FCC computer regulation,
345. See Wu, supra note 58, at 149; McCullagh, supra note 58 (examining the debate
over the openness of Internet access, addressing concerns expressed to the FCC about
proposed regulation of Internet services).
346. Werbach, supra note 226, at 58-59.
347. See id. Robert Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in
Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered
Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207, 214 (2003); Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. Mindel,
Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH L. 69, 69-70 (2002); Werbach, supra note 226, at 64-65; Richard S. Whitt, A
Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework
Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 594 (2004).
348. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 84
FEDERAL COMPUTER COMMISSION
the layered model offers at least two benefits. It separates out
regulation of physical infrastructure, software applications, and
content, even when all three are elements of the "computer industry"
or "the Internet." And it emphasizes the importance of interfaces
between layers as a critical competitive choke point.
One reason for the dread over a Federal Computer Commission
is the assumption that it would apply the kind of heavy-handed
pricing and content regulation to which telephone companies and
broadcasters have traditionally been subjected. Computers are either
outside the FCC's regulatory ambit, in which case they are totally free
from communications regulation, or they are subject to a panoply of
stifling obligations. This all-or-nothing dynamic is a direct
consequence of the vertical silo approach.
With a layered model, regulatory obligations can be targeted to
functionality at specific layers. Concerns about, say, whether VoIP
providers will interconnect so that any user can reach any other, are
different from questions about physical networks or content. If there
is a desire to require computers capable of receiving television
programming to support digital rights management capabilities, that
should not raise the possibility that those computers will be subject to
unrelated FCC rules or charges.
C. Living with the FCC
Thoughtful regulation can facilitate private market activity,
rather than thwarting it. For this to happen, though, market actors
must have a good understanding of where and how government will
act. Nothing is more disruptive to a well-functioning competitive
market than a surprise change in government policy, frustrating
investment-backed expectations.
The FCC and the private interests that seek to influence its
decisions should cease pretending that computers are magically
immune from the business and social policy issues that brought the
FCC into being. Regulators are right to be wary about quashing
dynamic, competitive markets. At some point though, willful neglect
of the implications of convergence will do more harm than good.
Computers are communications devices, and communications devices
are computers. There is no magic line that keeps FCC rules away
from one side of that equation.
The challenge, therefore, is to evaluate how and why the Federal
Computer Commission does its job. Regulators should try to apply
the right tools to the right problems. They should not ignore
situations where computer-based innovations justify explicit
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exemptions or temporary reprieves from existing rules or those where
new technology justifies removal of old rules from all market
participants. No one wants to see a scenario in which Microsoft or
Google have to jump through the same hoops to offer new services
that regulated communications carriers did for decades. However, if
those companies and their compatriots in the technology industry do
not engage the regulatory process, the outcome may be even worse.
In the end, computers are as much the solution as the problem
for the FCC. Precisely because they are so flexible, they can adapt to
address policy concerns in a more nuanced way than traditional
communications service providers. VoIP providers, for example, are
developing various mechanisms to provide emergency services access
that is comparable to or better than the 911 functionality of the
traditional telephone network.349 Online services such as AOL
provide parental content blocking tools that are more effective and
widely used than the hardware-based V-Chips in televisions.35 °
Software-defined radios and other unlicensed devices will squeeze
more capacity out of the airwaves. VoIP and IPTV, if allowed to
flourish, will create healthy competitive pressure on incumbents in
the phone and television industries.
The best way for the FCC to reduce the burdens its regulatory
oversight imposes may therefore be to broaden, rather than curtail, its
computer-oriented activities. It can only do so, however, through
honest recognition that there is no magic line dividing the regulated
communications world from the unregulated computer world.
CONCLUSION
Like it or not, the Federal Computer Commission is an
established reality. And there are many reasons to like it. Far from
being a dangerous adventure into uncharted territory, the FCC's
engagement with the computer industry has been, by and large, a
natural outgrowth of its traditional mission. Without the Federal
Computer Commission, the Internet may have been smothered by
349. See News Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Internet Policy Working Group
to Hold First "Solutions Summit" on Thursday, March 18, 2004, (Feb. 12, 2004)
(announcing FCC industry summit on E911 solution for VoIP); Matt Hines, Net Phone
Company's Answer to 911, CNET NEWS.COM, May 27, 2004, http://www.news.com
.com/2102-7352_3-5221705.html?tag=st.util.print.
350. See Jay Munro, At Home: AOL Parental Controls, PC MAG., Sept. 25, 2001,
available at http://www.pcmag.comlarticle2/0,1895,26620,00.asp; Parental Controls,
http://www.aol.com/info/parentcontrol.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
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monopolistic telephone companies, and exciting wireless data
technologies might not have seen the light of day.
There is certainly room to argue that current or future FCC
decisions go too far in shaping the computer industry. Convergence
provides not just freedom from old constraints in communications
policy but also an opportunity to learn from old mistakes. It is no
longer controversial that well-functioning, competitive markets are
superior to heavy-handed government allocation of resources in
virtually every respect. The right approach to many of the policy
questions described herein-computer-oriented or otherwise-may
be a less intrusive, smaller regulator, or one that relies more on
private negotiations or general purpose antitrust review to achieve its
goals.
Just stop pretending that FCC can never stand for Federal
Computer Commission.
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